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Article
An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s
Pardon Power
AARON RAPPAPORT
Most commentators assume that, except for the few restrictions expressly
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the President’s pardon power is unlimited. This
Paper suggests that this common view is mistaken in at least one unexpected way.
Presidential pardons must satisfy a modest procedural rule: they must list the
specific crimes covered by the pardon. The “specificity requirement” means that
vague and broadly worded pardons are invalid.
This claim bears a significant burden of persuasion, since it runs so counter to
accepted opinion. Nonetheless, that burden can be met. This Paper’s argument rests
on an originalist understanding of the constitutional text, an approach that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed as the appropriate method for interpreting
the Pardon Clause. That approach leaves little doubt that a specificity requirement
is a binding limitation on the President’s pardon power.
The final part of this Paper examines the ramifications of the specificity
requirement for federal criminal investigations, particularly investigations into
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. The specificity requirement
may prove surprisingly significant in this latter context, since it both raises the
political costs, and narrows the legal scope, of any pardon the President might grant
to former campaign advisors. In effect, the requirement strengthens the hand of
investigators, increasing the likelihood that defendants will cooperate with the
prosecution. In so doing, the specificity requirement serves as an unexpected ally in
the fight for political accountability and in defense of the rule of law.
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An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s
Pardon Power
AARON RAPPAPORT *
INTRODUCTION
Not since President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon has the pardon power
been the focus of so much media and public attention. As Donald Trump’s
legal troubles have multiplied, speculation has intensified that the President
may attempt to use the power to insulate associates and advisors from
criminal liability.1 A pardon, it is believed, would eliminate the risk of
federal prosecution, undermining the leverage prosecutors have to persuade
these men to offer possibly incriminating information about the President.
To be sure, a federal pardon would not eliminate all pressure on Trump’s
associates. Federal pardons, after all, insulate individuals only from federal
prosecutions, not state charges. The New York State Attorney General,
among others, has been looking into allegations of wrongdoing by some of
Trump’s associates.2 Nonetheless, eliminating federal exposure would
mitigate the potential threats against these individuals and, depending on the
specific facts of the cases, might eliminate criminal liability entirely. In this
sense, a federal pardon could pose a significant roadblock to prosecutors

*

Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks to Mark Osler,
Ian Williams, and Zachary Price for comments on an earlier version of this Article. Special thanks to
Erin Barlow, Jennifer Bentley, Deborah Brundy, Ally Girouard, Sarah Glendon, Brenly Pereira, and
Andrew Johnson for exceptional research assistance.
1
Even more controversially, the President might attempt to pardon himself. That possibility raises
distinct legal issues that have been addressed in other papers. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The
Constitutional Case Against Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 781 (1996) (discussing the
constitutionality of a presidential self-pardon through a historical, textual, structural, and doctrinal
analysis); Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis
of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 222 (1999) (analyzing the self-pardon
from various perspectives to conclude that the self-pardon is constitutional); Mark Strasser, The Limits
of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J.
85, 149–52 (2002) (discussing the presidential self-pardon). As such, the lawfulness of self-pardons is
not directly addressed below.
2
See, e.g., Natasha Bertrand, New York Prosecutors May Pose a Bigger Threat to Trump than
Mueller, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/new-yorkprosecutors-allen-weisselberg-trump/568516/; David A. Fahrenthold, New York Attorney General Moves
to Open a State Criminal Tax Investigation into Michael Cohen, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-york-attorney-general-moves-to-open-a-state-criminaltax-investigation-into-michael-cohen/2018/08/23/a320754e-a746-11e8-8fac12e98c13528d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ddfade1542f5.
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hoping to unravel what precisely happened during the presidential election
of 2016.
If Trump pardons one or more of these individuals, could an argument
be made that these pardons are invalid? The common view is “no.” The
general assumption is that the President’s pardon power is virtually
unlimited. The President might suffer political fallout from granting
immunity, but the pardons themselves are widely seen as beyond judicial
review. That is true even if those pardons are issued for corrupt or
self-interested reasons.3
This Paper suggests that this common view is mistaken in at least one
unexpected way. Though the substantive scope of the pardon power is broad,
one modest procedural rule must be followed: the pardon must identify the
specific crimes covered by the order.4 The “specificity requirement,” as I
will call it, means that vague and broadly worded pardons are not valid.5
The claim that a specificity requirement exists may sound doubtful,
since it runs against the widespread view that the President’s pardon power
is unfettered. It also seems to run against historical practice. President Ford’s
pardon of Nixon was but the most famous example of a vague and general
pardon that brought a federal prosecution to a halt.6 According to its terms,
Nixon’s pardon applied to “all offenses against the United States” during his
administration; the wrongdoings were never specified.7 Even beyond this
famous (or, depending on one’s viewpoint, infamous) example, the
existence of a specificity requirement has never been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court.8
3

Several commentators have suggested that a pardon issued for corrupt reasons could result in a
separate charge against the President for obstruction of justice. See, e.g., Meghan Keneally, Yes, Trump
Can Pardon Manafort and Cohen, But It Would Be a ‘Legal and Strategic Error,’ Expert Says, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:23 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-pardon-manafort-cohen-legalstrategic-error-expert/story?id=57355504; James D. Robenalt, The Pardon Power Can Be Used to
Obstruct Justice. Just Ask Richard Nixon, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/168686. For a somewhat more skeptical view, see Daniel J.
Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1281–82 (2018).
However, even if separate obstruction charges could be brought, the pardons themselves would likely be
upheld and remain binding.
4
This is a procedural constraint in the sense that it imposes restrictions on how pardons are
structured, rather than on who or what can be pardoned.
5
This is not the first paper to mention a specificity requirement. In a piece published after the
Watergate controversy, Hugh Macgill explores the possibility of such a requirement. See Hugh C.
Macgill, The Nixon Pardon: Limits on the Benign Prerogative, 7 CONN. L. REV. 56, 74–84 (1974)
(discussing several possible constraints on the President’s pardon power, including the specificity
requirement). This Article builds and expands upon that work.
6
The significance of this pardon is discussed in more depth later in this Paper. See infra Part III.B.
7
Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,601–02 (Sept. 10, 1974).
8
Petitioners before the Supreme Court have raised the specificity argument at least once. In Burdick
v. United States, the petitioner argued that, “the pardon is illegal for the absence of specification, not
reciting the offenses upon which it is intended to operate; worthless, therefore, as immunity.” 236 U.S.
79, 93 (1915). The Court, however, declined to rule on the issue, preferring instead to deny the
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Given this background, the claim that a specificity requirement exists
faces a heavy burden of persuasion. Nonetheless, the burden can be met.
This Paper demonstrates that the arguments in favor of a specificity
requirement are not only plausible, but highly persuasive. The argument
rests on an originalist reading of the pardon power, an approach that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed for interpreting the Pardon Clause.
The Court has explained that original intent can be discerned by looking at
English practices before the Constitution’s drafting. The common law, in
short, informed the Framers’ understanding of the President’s pardon power.
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little effort has been made to explore the
dimensions of the pardon power in England during the first half of the
eighteenth century.9 A closer look reveals that a specificity requirement was
widely understood to exist in English law during the period. In this regard,
the originalist methodology favored by the Supreme Court confirms that a
specificity requirement should be part of our own understanding of the
pardon power in the U.S. Constitution.
Even if a specificity requirement exists, one might wonder whether it
would matter as a check on presidential misuse of the pardon. A specificity
requirement, after all, is a rather modest restriction; it does not prevent a
President from issuing a pardon to whomever he wishes on whatever
grounds. Consequently, it would not prevent the President from pardoning
any of his associates, for any crime committed, for any reason.
Yet, a specificity requirement might prove unexpectantly significant,
especially in cases where the President’s associates have been accused of
crimes that, if specified in a pardon document, would prove highly
embarrassing to the President himself. It is one thing for a President to offer
a general, non-specific pardon that covers “all crimes committed” by an
associate. It is quite another to list a series of offenses, such as money
laundering, wire fraud, and (in the worst case) conspiracy to interfere with
the electoral process. It is widely understood that the receipt of a pardon
represents an acceptance of guilt.10 Consequently, the specific articulation
of crimes pardoned offers the public a clear idea of what precisely the
offender is guilty of, while a vague pardon allows the President to avoid
petitioner’s claim on other grounds. Id. at 93–95.
9
There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 499–500 (1977) (examining English pardon power
in the first half of the eighteenth century); Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in
England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 51–62 (1963) (same).
10
See Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94 (noting that a pardon requires an individual “to confess his guilt in
order to avoid a conviction of it”); see also Pardoning Power, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 228 (1865) (“There
can be no pardon where there is no actual or imputed guilt.”). For a different and nuanced view, see
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Is Accepting a Pardon an Admission of Guilt?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/26/is-accepting-a-pardon-anadmission-of-guilt/?utm_term=.6b626b5480c2.
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responsibility by hiding behind the ambiguity of the pardon’s general
language. In this regard, a specificity requirement raises the political costs
of making a pardon.
The power of the specificity requirement is not surprising. It is premised
on the idea that transparency is the best disinfectant when it comes to
governmental abuse. Requiring clarity about what is being pardoned can
help deter the most egregious uses of the pardon—those employed for
partisan or corrupt reasons. It can also promote political accountability—and
in extreme cases trigger impeachment proceedings—should the power of the
pardon be misused. In short, it helps ensure that the “benign prerogative” of
the pardon remains truly benign.11
This Paper proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the importance of
using an originalist methodology when interpreting the Pardon Clause of the
Constitution and how that approach requires a careful exhumation of
common law practices at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. Part II
examines these common law practices in detail. This Part demonstrates that
a clear specificity requirement existed in the common law at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting. It also explains how the requirement is consistent
with core constitutional values embraced by the Framers during the drafting
period.
Part III evaluates two major counterarguments. One is a textual
argument, grounded in the specific language of the Pardon Clause. The other
is an argument based on historical practice, which is essentially an argument
that the specificity requirement is invalid because it is inconsistent with the
way pardons have been used in the past. Both objections, we will see, are
superficially appealing but ultimately unpersuasive.
Part IV returns to the controversies surrounding President Trump and
his inner circle of advisors and associates. This Part elaborates how the
specificity requirement could generate problems for the President should he
attempt to use the pardon power to short-circuit federal investigations into
possible Administration corruption. The specificity requirement limits the
effectiveness of any pardon that Trump issues, thus diminishing its value to
any offender contemplating whether to cooperate with investigators. In
doing so, the specificity requirement serves as an unexpected ally in the fight
for political accountability and in defense of the rule of law.
I. THE PARDON POWER
It is widely recognized that the federal pardon power is expansive in its
scope. The Constitution provides that: “The President . . . shall have Power
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
11
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the “benign prerogative of
pardoning”).
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except in Cases of Impeachment.” As the Supreme Court has affirmed, the
pardon power has few limitations. The President can issue a pardon at any
time after a crime has been committed, even prior to arrest or indictment.13
The pardon can be granted for any crime without exception.14 The President
need not articulate reasons for the pardon. Indeed, it is commonly thought
that the motivation for the pardon is not reviewable by courts regardless of
the appearance of unseemly or inappropriate motivations.15 Finally, the
pardon power cannot be restricted by Congress through legislation.16
Of course, the pardon power is not entirely unfettered. The text of the
Constitution spells out two clear constraints. First, the power conferred by
the Constitution is restricted to federal crimes (“offenses against the United
States”).17 Second, a pardon cannot insulate an official from the effects of
an impeachment proceeding.18 Apart from these textual constraints,
however, many doubt whether any other limit exists. In dicta, the Supreme
Court itself has stated that, beyond these two exceptions, “[t]he power thus
conferred is unlimited.”19
Yet the Court’s own decisions recognize that the reality is more
complicated. In various rulings, the Supreme Court has endorsed modest
non-textual limits on the validity of pardons. These might be called
“implicit” limitations on the pardon power. In Burdick v. United States, for
example, the Court stated that a pardon is valid only if accepted by the
defendant.20 Thus, “acceptance” serves as a limitation on the pardon’s
12

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“The executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses
after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial.”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 380 (1867) (“The [pardon] power . . . may be exercised at any time after [the] commission [of a
crime], either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and
judgment. . . . If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent
upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights . . . .”). This view also seems to be supported by debates at the
constitutional convention—as William Duker writes, during the debates on the pardon power, “Luther
Martin moved to insert ‘after conviction’ after the words ‘reprieves and pardons,’ but withdrew the
motion after the persuasive argument of Mr. Wilson that a ‘pardon before conviction might be necessary,
in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices.’” Duker, supra note 9, at 501–02 (citation omitted).
14
See Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (The pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law.”).
15
See 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 332 (1892) (“A pardon is a gracious act of mercy resting on any
ground which the Executive may regard as sufficient to call for its exercise.”); 20 RULING CASE LAW
518, 533 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1918) [hereinafter RULING CASE LAW]
(“Whatever may have been the reasons for granting the pardon, the courts cannot decline to give it effect,
if it be valid upon its face.”).
16
Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (“This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. . . .
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.”).
17
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18
Id.
19
Garland, 71 U.S. at 380.
20
See 236 U.S. 79, 89–91 (1915) (explaining that the convict must accept pardon for it to be
effective). The circumstances under which an offender might reject a pardon are, as one might expect,
13
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validity. Similarly, the Supreme Court has ruled that a pardon must be
pleaded to be valid.21 Failure to plead a pardon means that the court need not
and should not take cognizance of it. In a separate case, the Supreme Court
ruled that a President may pardon for criminal contempt but may not pardon
a case involving civil contempt even if the sanction for that contempt is
prison.22 Finally, the President cannot pardon a crime before it has been
committed.23
These examples illustrate that the Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized
certain, modest, non-textual limitations on the pardon power. The question
naturally arises: on what basis does the Court find these implicit limitations?
The methodology employed by the Court is typically an originalist one: the
Court has sought to identify the Framers’ understandings regarding the
scope of the pardon power at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.
What sort of information informs that assessment? In the case of
pardons, the sources are limited. The constitutional debates, for example,
contain few references to the pardon power, and none are particularly
substantive.24 The Federalist Papers provide little more insight, offering a
quite unusual. In Burdick, the defendant refused to testify against a co-conspirator on the grounds that
his testimony might be self-incriminating. Id. at 86. The President gave the defendant a pardon to nullify
that argument, and thus to prevent him from “taking the Fifth.” Id. To escape the snare, the defendant
refused to accept the pardon. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that, by refusing the pardon, the defendant
voided the grant, undermining the prosecution’s strategy. Id. at 89–91.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of this rule, holding that the
defendant’s consent was not necessary when the President seeks to reduce a capital sentence to life in
prison. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927). In a four-page opinion, the Court noted that the
“opposite answer would . . . deprive [the President] of the power in the most important cases and require
him to permit an execution which he had decided ought not to take place.” Id. at 487. The Court thus
concluded: “We are of opinion that the reasoning of Burdick v. United States, is not to be extended to the
present case.” Id. at 487–88 (internal citation omitted).
21
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162 (1833).
22
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925).
23
See id. at 120 (affirming in dicta that pardons will apply after commission of offense); Garland,
71 U.S. at 380 (same). The Department of Justice has long adopted this position, as well. See, e.g., 6 Op.
Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854) (“[I]f a pardon could be granted in advance for offences to be committed
thereafter, it would include a power to grant indulgences to commit crimes and offences, to license vice,
to dispense with the sanction of the laws, without good motive, without reason, but solely by arbitrary
will. . . . A pardon for an offence not yet committed would be void.”).
This may seem self-evident, but it certainly is not the only possible approach. In early English
history, the King of England claimed the right to grant “dispensations,” which were essentially a license
to violate the law. See 6 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (“That in
the Middle Ages a suspending and dispensing power was vested in the king is unquestionable.”); Zachary
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 690 n.63 (2014) (describing
kings’ access to dispensing power). The use of the power by James II was widely condemned, and the
practice was ultimately prohibited by the English Bill of Rights. An Act Declaring the Rights and
Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2,
7 (Eng.).
24
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974) (“The records of the Constitutional Convention, as
noted earlier, reveal little discussion or debate on § 2, cl. 1, of Art. II.”).
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single substantive discussion of the pardon power. Specifically, in
Federalist 74, Hamilton defends the importance of giving the President
alone the power to pardon. He concludes: “[T]he benign prerogative of
pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”26 That
statement confirms that the power is broad, but at the same time it
acknowledges that some constraints on that power may be necessary and
appropriate.
Given the haziness of these sources, the Supreme Court has looked
elsewhere for insight into the Founders’ intent. Specifically, it has
affirmed—repeatedly and consistently—that the key source for interpreting
the scope of the pardon power should be English common law practices
immediately before the drafting of the Constitution.27 Limitations on the
pardon power that existed at common law should be incorporated into the
constitutional scheme. As the Supreme Court explained in Ex parte
Grossman:
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely
except by reference to the common law and to British
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who
submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the
Thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere
of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary.
. . . [W]hen they came to put their conclusions into the form of
fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in
terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly
and easily understood.28
It was this deep familiarity with English law that explains why the
Framers adopted the pardon authority with so little debate concerning its
precise scope and meaning.29 In practice, the Supreme Court has relied upon
25

THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
27
See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 261–62 (“[T]he draftsmen were well acquainted with the English
Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it existed in 1787.”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 307, 311 (1855) (“At the time of the adoption of the constitution, American statesmen were
conversant with the laws of England, and familiar with the prerogatives exercised by the crown. . . . At
that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word pardon. . . . We must
then give the word the same meaning as prevailed here and in England at the time it found a place in the
constitution.”); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (“As this power had been
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to
whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the
operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which
it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.”).
28
Grossman, 267 U.S. at 108–09.
29
Schick, 419 U.S. at 260 (Because of their familiarity with the common law, the Framers did not
“devote extended debate to [the Pardon Clause’s] meaning.”).
26
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these common law practices to identify many of the non-textual constraints
on the pardon power, including cases holding that a pardon is valid only if
accepted and pleaded by the defendant.30 The same approach underlies the
Court’s ruling that pardons may be granted for criminal but not civil
contempt.31 Finally, the Court has relied on common law practices to resolve
certain questions about the pardon’s operation, such as whether the President
may issue “conditional” pardons.32
In short, the Supreme Court has made clear that certain implicit
limitations on the pardon power exist, and that these are rooted in the
common law practices in use at the time of the Founding. The question then
follows: Do other common law limitations exist, limitations that have yet to
be recognized by the Court? In particular, does the common law embrace a
“specificity requirement”? The answer, as the next part explains, is yes.
II. PARDONS AND THE COMMON LAW
The English common law is sometimes discussed as if it has a static
meaning. But of course, the content of the English common law evolved
over time as English society changed. Between the Middle Ages and the
eighteenth century, England transformed from a near-absolute monarchy to
something much closer to a representative government. The contours of the
pardon power, a central prerogative of the Crown, changed accordingly. As
the U.S. Supreme Court observed relatively recently, “[t]he history of [the
pardon] power, which was centuries old, reveals a gradual contraction to
avoid its abuse and misuse. Changes were made as potential or actual abuses
were perceived . . . .”33 The implication is that our attention should be
focused more on the common law authorities of the eighteenth century, the
period right before the Constitution’s drafting, than on earlier ages.
At the same time, to fully appreciate the common law practices at the
time of the American Revolution, it is useful to have a historical perspective.
Such a perspective highlights how restrictions on the pardon power in the
mid-eighteenth century built upon limitations established in earlier periods.
For that reason, the first section below briefly examines the early history of
30
Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 89–90 (1915) (relying on common law practices to hold
that a pardon is only effective if accepted); Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 161–62 (same).
31
Grossman, 267 U.S. at 111 (explaining that in distinguishing between pardons for civil and
criminal contempt, the Court expressly relies on English practices at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption).
32
Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310–14 (1855).
33
Schick, 419 U.S. at 260–61. As John Yoo put it, “[t]he eighteenth-century British constitution
was composed of a series of unwritten principles . . . . These principles, which defined the relationship
between the government and its people, and between the Crown and Parliament, had undergone
significant change during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The meaning and significance of
these constitutional developments would have been familiar to ratifiers of the American Constitution.”
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 31–32 (2005).

2020]

PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER

281

the pardon power in England, a period during which the early seeds of the
specificity requirement were laid. The second section looks at the events
leading to the Glorious Revolution, a pivotal event in the transformation of
English political society. The third section then examines the period after
the English Revolution (and immediately before the American one), when
broader limits on the King’s pardon power were imposed.34
A. Pardons Before the Glorious Revolution
Evidence of the King’s power to pardon can be found early in English
history. During the Anglo-Saxon period, the King was seen as having the
power to grant mercy, a power only strengthened with the Norman conquest
in the eleventh century.35 The power was not unique to the King—the
Church and other entities shared the power to pardon—but the King was
seen as the primary holder of that power.36
The centrality of the King in English society gave the pardon power a
certain logic. Since crimes were offenses against the King, the King could
grant mercy to criminals at his discretion. Of course, this ancient prerogative
was not without its downsides. As a tool of discretion, the pardon power
could be—and often was—abused. Pardons were granted at the request of
favored nobles or offered in return for compensation or loyalty.37
Parliament’s concerns about these kinds of abuses triggered a number of
efforts to restrict its operation, including several during the fourteenth
century. Most were either ignored or repealed under pressure from the
King.38
34
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is a convenient point of demarcation in this discussion. In the
centuries prior to that event, the King tended to have the upper hand over Parliament; the pardon power
was correspondingly broad in scope. In the decades afterwards, Parliament was resurgent, and the pardon
power was subject to increasing attempts at curtailment. We are not alone in focusing on the post-1688
period. See Patrick Cowlishaw, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. 149, 159–60
(1975) (asserting that focus should be on the post-1688 era because separation of powers becomes more
significant in that period in England). Whether the Glorious Revolution itself marked a dramatic change
in the institutional structure of English society, or whether it was a small part of a broader trend, remains
a point of dispute among historians. See Gary W. Cox, Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional
Watershed?, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 567, 568 (2012) (“I argue that the Glorious Revolution should have
affected a narrower range of transactions than North and Weingast envisioned; but that it nonetheless
had fundamental effects.”); Steven C.A. Pincus & James A. Robinson, What Really Happened During
the Glorious Revolution? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 729, 2011) (“This
account of the decisive and innovative nature of the Glorious Revolution has long been disputed by
specialists in both political and economic history.”).
35
See Grupp, supra note 9, at 54–55.
36
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES:
PARDON 28 (1939) [hereinafter 3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES]; Grupp, supra note 9, at 55
(discussing the range of institutions that possessed the power of the pardon).
37
3 SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 36, at 30, 32 (discussing abuses).
38
The first efforts occurred at the start of the century, in 1308 and 1309. Duker, supra note 9, at
479–80. These were largely ignored by the King. Id. at 482. After eliminating his opponents at the Battle
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But not all. Perhaps the most notable attempt occurred in 1389, when
Parliament enacted the first “specificity requirement” in English law. The
Act of 1389 (which I will refer to as the “Pardon Act”) states that no pardon
“shall be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the death of a man
slain by await, assault, or malice prepensed, treason, or rape . . . unless the
same . . . be specified in the same charter.”39 In short, without a specific
articulation of the listed crimes, the King’s pardon would not be deemed
valid.40
The Pardon Act is notable as a forerunner to a much broader particularity
requirement adopted later. But it was an extremely limited restriction on the
royal prerogative. As a preliminary matter, it applied only to the most serious
crimes: treason, rape, and murder. Moreover, it did not bar the King from
granting pardons for these crimes; it only required him to specify the
offenses to be absolved (and, in the case at least of homicide, the manner in
which the killing occurred).41
In fact, the Act was even more limited than this. Because the King was
recognized as having the ultimate authority to suspend the law, the Pardon
Act did not actually bar the King from issuing a non-specific (i.e., a
of Boroughbridge, the King summoned Parliament. He directed them in 1322 to enact the Statutes of
York that, among other things, restored the King’s unrestricted powers over the pardon. During the next
sixty-five years, Parliament repeatedly enacted statutes to restrict the King’s power, but with limited
effect (in the years 1328, 1336, 1352, and, as discussed in the text, 1389).
39
Other Statutes Made at Westminster 1389, 13 Rich. 2 c. 1 (Eng.).
40
The existence of a narrow specificity requirement is confirmed by Edwardo Coke. See, e.g.,
EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 (London, M.
Flescher, for W. Lee, & D. Pakeman 2d ed. 1648) (“Before this Statute of 13 R. 2, by pardon of all
felonies, treason was pardoned, and so was murder . . . . At this day by the pardon of all felonies, the
death of man is not pardoned. These be excellent laws for direction, and for the peace of the Realm.”).
Coke published his masterwork, the Institutes of the Laws, between 1628 and 1644 (with several parts
published posthumously), and he is often described as the most influential common law jurist in English
history. His work is widely seen as an authoritative survey of the common law prior to the Glorious
Revolution. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1771 (2008) (“Edward Coke has been described
as the most important common law jurist in English history.”).
41
For homicide, it was not enough simply to mention the crime pardoned. The King also had to
specify details about how the murder was accomplished. To understand the reason for this added
specificity requirement, a bit of historical background is needed. Under the English common law, murder
was an expansive doctrine. All killings were treated as murder punishable by death, no matter how the
killings were carried out. Thus, not only where intentional killings treated as murder, but so were killings
that were carried out in self-defense or caused accidentally. See Duker, supra note 9, at 479 (“Many of
the defects in the practice of pardoning rested in the criminal justice system of which it was a part. Prior
to the sixteenth century, the common law treated all homicides as felonies. In a society with no other
means of flexibility, the pardon served as the sole instrument of justice for those who should not be
punished.” (footnote omitted)). For the latter types of homicides, a defendant’s only relief would come
from the King through a pardon. The common law wanted to discourage pardons for murders carried out
without such mitigation, those accomplished by “[lying in] []wait, [a]ssault, or [m]alice prepense.” Id. at
479, 485. The common law courts anticipated that, by requiring the King to articulate the kind of
homicide, it would deter the King from giving pardons for these homicides, while leaving undisturbed
the more deserving ones.
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“general”) pardon for treason, rape, and murder. To do so, the King merely
had to affirm that he was acting “non obstante”—notwithstanding—
Parliament’s law.42 The King, in short, had the power to suspend the law.
This power did not mean that the Pardon Act’s restrictions were entirely
meaningless. Rather, it meant that the King had to highlight the unusual
nature of his conduct, by acknowledging he was acting contrary to the will
of Parliament. The hope was that, by requiring the King to either specify the
offense or announce his desire to suspend the law, the King would be
deterred from issuing pardons for serious offenses, at least unless significant
aggravating factors could be identified. Thus, as one commentator put it,
“Parliament could not conceive that the king would ever pardon an offense
by name that was attended by such aggravations.”43
The Pardon Act represents one of the first attempts to constrain the
King’s pardon powers. The requirement’s limited scope reflected the weak
position of the Parliament at the time of its passage. Parliament did not
believe that it could bar the King outright from using general pardons.
Instead, it adopted a narrow specificity requirement, hoping that specific
disclosure of the offense would reduce the improper use of pardons, at least
in the most serious cases. Over the next two centuries, Parliament
occasionally attempted to restrict the King’s pardon power further. 44 These
efforts, however, were largely ineffective and, over time, the King solidified
his position as the dominant power in the Kingdom.45 His broad pardon
authority reflected that lofty position.46 And yet, within a century, the
balance of power in the Kingdom would be radically transformed.
42

EDWARDO COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 424–25
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS] (In enacting the statute, Parliament “knew
that the King could not be restrained by any Act to make a Pardon; for mercy and power to Pardon is a
Prerogative incident, solely and inseparably to the person of the King: And it hath oft-times been
adjudged that the King can Pardon Murther by generall words without any expresse mention, with Non
obstante, the said Statute, see 4 Hen. 4. cap. 31. . . . But in all such cases, although that the King may
dispense with Statutes, yet a generall dispensation or grant without Non obstante is void.”).
43
Duker, supra note 9, at 485. As Edward Coke suggested, a specificity requirement would deter
such actions because publicity and transparency would increase the cost of making such pardons. Thus,
Coke wrote, this was “the surest way that the Parliament could take to restrain the King to pardon
Murther, unless that he Pardon it by express terms, which they thought the King would not.” SELECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 42, at 424.
44
For example, in 1403, Parliament “enacted a statute affixing a financial penalty on the
intermediary.” Duker, supra note 9, at 485.
45
More accurately, during this period, Parliament began to cede power to the King. In 1534, for
example, Parliament passed the “Statute of Treason,” which made it a crime to “deny the King’s
supremacy.” Id. at 487 n.60. The next year, it enacted a statute that gave the King sole authority over
pardons, precluding other institutions (such as the Church) from granting clemency. Id. at 486–87
(discussing a statute of 1535, which “solidified the king’s jurisdiction over the power to pardon by
removing the clemency power from all others”); Grupp, supra note 9, at 55 (same).
46
Apart from the specificity requirement, only a few other constraints existed on the King’s ability
to grant mercy. For example, according to Coke, the King could pardon robberies, felonies against the
peace, and homicide only by issuing the pardon by oath and specifying the name of those who offered
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B. Lord Danby and L’Affaire Francaise
The seventeenth century marked a period of intense turmoil in England
over royal power. The battle played out as an institutional battle between the
King and the Parliament, a conflict with significant religious and cultural
overtones. The climactic events of the conflict, the Glorious Revolution of
1688 and the crowning of William of Orange the following year, were
notable events in the emergence of Parliament as the dominant political
institution in English society.47
Not surprisingly, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw
challenges to the King’s use of the pardon power. The fight over pardons
came to a head in the 1670s when several attempts were made to restrict the
King’s power to grant mercy.48 The most dramatic event, and the one most
relevant for our discussion, occurred at the end of the 1670s. The central
figure in the dispute was Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, who was the Lord
High Treasurer of England.
Danby had the unfortunate luck to be at the center of an explosive
intrigue involving King Charles of England and Louis XIV of France. To
understand the Danby affair, one needs to have a sense of the deep
antagonism at this time between many in Parliament and the Catholic King
of France. The anti-French contingent in Parliament wanted to renew
England’s relationship with France’s enemy, the Dutch Republic. Danby
himself exhibited a strong anti-French orientation, seeing the Dutch
Republic as the key to the expansion of English commerce.
King Charles of England, however, had a different agenda. In 1670,
King Charles signed a secret treaty with Louis XIV (the “secret” Treaty of
Dover), in which Charles pledged to aid the French in a planned attack on
the Dutch.49 In addition, Charles promised to convert to Roman Catholicism.
information to support the pardon (to guard against deception). If the information “be found untrue, the
Charter shall be disallowed.” COKE, supra note 40, at 236. More generally, Coke affirmed that any false
information given to the King to obtain the grant of mercy would make the pardon void. Id. at 238.
47
See Cox, supra note 34, at 595 (“Stuart England was enmeshed in a century-long struggle
between ‘parliamentary supremacy’ and ‘absolutism.’ To achieve absolute rule, the Crown sought better
constitutional abilities to control Parliament, to rule legally without Parliament, and to crush Parliament
militarily. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament enacted statutes, adopted rules and began practices
that blunted all three prongs of absolutist strategy. . . . Cumulatively, constitutional engineering after the
Revolution pushed parliamentary supremacy much more than anything that had been tried before,
because it pushed that project on all three defensive fronts simultaneously.”).
48
For example, in 1673, a judicial tribunal held that the King was barred from pardoning offenses,
such as nuisances, that led to continuing harms to private parties. Duker, supra note 9, at 486. In 1679,
Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act, which among other things prohibited anyone from causing
an offender to be transported outside the realm (to undermine the offender’s ability to seek habeas). The
King was barred from granting clemency to violators of the rule. Grupp, supra note 9, at 57.
49
CLARE JACKSON, CHARLES II: THE STAR KING 31 (2016); MARK KISHLANSKY, THE PENGUIN
HISTORY OF BRITAIN: A MONARCHY TRANSFORMED, BRITAIN 1630-1714, at 245 (6th ed., Penguin
Books 1997) (1996).
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In return, the French King committed to pay Charles 230,000 pounds per
year.50
The result was a new war between England and the Dutch (the third
Anglo-Dutch War). The war erupted in 1672 when the French and English
fleets joined together to attack the Dutch state. Though the start of the war
seemed promising for England, the Anglo-French alliance ultimately
suffered serious strategic setbacks.51 As the war turned, public opinion began
to sour on King Charles, stoked by growing suspicions that Charles was
working with France to reverse Protestant domination in England. Fearing
that his position was becoming untenable, King Charles agreed to terminate
the war effort. In 1674, the English and Dutch signed a peace treaty ending
their hostilities.52
Rather than break off his secret French ties, however, King Charles
decided to use the growing anti-French fervor as leverage to ask King Louis
for an increase in his support payments.53 In return for the additional funds,
the King promised ongoing English neutrality and the suspension
(“prorogation”) of Parliament.54 Danby was an awkward choice to lead this
mission, given his past opposition to the French.55 Nonetheless, Danby
agreed to fulfill his duty on behalf of the King.
Ultimately, the secret negotiations between Danby and the French King
broke down, due at least in part to Danby’s intransigence in negotiations.56
King Louis retaliated by acquiring—and then disclosing—one of Danby’s
secret letters discussing the agreement between the two Kings.57
50
R. Hutton, The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670, 29 HIST. J. 297, 303 (1986).
Louis XIV also agreed to pay Charles 160,000 pounds for the public profession of his Catholicism. Id.
To put this amount in perspective, in 1667, “the regular revenue of the crown yielded less than 900,000.”
Id. at 304.
51
KISHLANSKY, supra note 49, at 246.
52
C. R. Boxer, Some Second Thoughts on the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674, 19
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 67, 91 (1968).
53
For background on these machinations, see Clyde L. Grose, Louis XIV’s Financial Relations with
Charles II and the English Parliament, 1 J. MOD. HIST. 177, 195–97 (1929). See also 42 OSBORNE,
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 297 (Sidney Lee ed., London, Smith, Elder & Co. 1895).
54
E. R. Edwards, Montagu, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1660-1690, HIST.
PARLIAMENT, https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/montagu-ralph1638-1709 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Montagu].
55
A. M. Evans, The Imprisonment of Lord Danby in the Tower, 1679-1684, 12 TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 105, 106–07 (1929).
56
See Grose, supra note 53, at 184–93 (discussing Danby’s role in the negotiations between the
two monarchs).
57
The details of how the letter was obtained are complicated. After receiving the King’s
instructions, Danby apparently wrote a secret letter to Montagu, the English minister at the Court of
Versailles. The letter “empower[ed] [Montagu] to make an offer of neutrality for the price of 6,000,000
livres.” 2 HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION OF
HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 410 (London, John Murray 8th ed. 1855). Montagu understood
the importance of secrecy, and he responded to Danby by affirming, “You may be confident of my
secrecy about this whole affair . . . both for the King’s, your lordship’s and my own sake, for it would be
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As Louis expected, Parliament was furious at the duplicity of this
arrangement and immediately resolved on Danby’s impeachment. Though
the letters were clearly issued at the King’s direction, Danby was a much
safer target than the King.58 Some contend that the impeachment
“establish[ed] the principle that no minister can shelter himself behind the
throne by pleading obedience to the orders of his sovereign.”59 But a more
accurate appraisal might be that the action reflected the fact that the King
was untouchable, so a more vulnerable substitute would have to be punished
in his stead.
Danby’s impeachment was just the beginning of the saga. Under British
law, impeachment could include not just removal from office, but criminal
penalties.60 The Lords thus met to decide whether Danby deserved bail and
whether his crimes should be treated as a misdemeanor or felony.61 King
Charles pushed back, issuing Danby a pardon and, later, dissolving
Parliament.62 Members of Parliament reacted furiously, questioning the
King’s authority to protect his minister in an impeachment proceeding.63
The dispute triggered a major conflict over the King’s power to exercise
the pardon. Although no rule barred the King from granting a pardon in an
impeachment proceeding, Parliament remained firm, declaring the pardon
illegal and demanding judgment against Danby (now imprisoned in the
Tower of London).64 The result was a kind of constitutional crisis: a standoff
between Parliament and the King. The impasse would last five years. Danby
would spend most of that time in the Tower of London.65 The crisis did not
fully resolve itself until King Charles’ unexpected death in 1685 and the
subsequent coronation of James II. Danby’s sentence was then reversed, and
no popular or creditable thing if it were known.” Montagu, supra note 54. Nonetheless, Montagu became
angry after Danby failed to support his efforts to obtain higher office. After receiving compensation from
the French, Montagu brought to public attention the letters Danby wrote arranging payments from Louis
to Charles. 42 OSBORNE, supra note 53, at 298.
58
The King’s ultimate responsibility for the letters was plain. At the bottom of each letter was the
King’s own handwriting: “This letter is writ by my order, C.R.” CHARLES KNIGHT, POPULAR HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 245 (1880). In addition, Charles himself testified before the House of Lords that Danby
was acting on the King’s command. See Duker, supra note 9, at 488.
59
2 HALLAM, supra note 57, at 411.
60
RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 536 (“In England, the judgment on impeachments is not
confined to mere removal from office, but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the
offense. The House of Lords, therefore, on a conviction, may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment;
or perpetual banishment; or forfeiture of goods and lands; or fine and ransom; or imprisonment, as well
as removal from office, and incapacity to hold office, according to the nature and aggravation of the
offense.”).
61
2 HALLAM, supra note 57, at 412–13.
62
Id. at 414–15.
63
Duker, supra note 9, at 489–90.
64
Id. at 493 (“No act on the statute books limited the royal attribute of mercy in cases of
impeachment.”).
65
Danby remained “untried [and the] impeachment was never resumed.” Id. at 495. He was released
on bail from the Tower of London in 1684. Evans, supra note 55, at 133.
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Parliament was reinstated. Even then, Parliament continued to assert that
the original pardon was invalid.67 It would soon take steps to ensure that the
King would never again use a pardon to protect his ministers from
impeachment.
C. Royal Prerogatives After the Glorious Revolution
The conflict between the King and Parliament was, on one level, an
institutional dispute with foreign relations implications. But it played out
within a broader religious conflict between Protestants, who dominated
Parliament, and a Royal family who was thought—accurately—to harbor
Catholic sympathies.68 That broader religious and cultural conflict came to
a head in 1688, when King James’ Catholic wife, Queen Mary, gave birth to
a Roman Catholic son and heir, James Francis Edward.69
The possibility of a Catholic dynasty triggered a backlash.70 Seeking to
restore Protestant control, influential protestants (including Danby himself)
invited William of Orange to invade England. The Glorious Revolution, as
it was called, culminated in 1689 with the crowning of William and his wife,
Mary II, as the joint sovereigns of England.71
The Glorious Revolution undermined the idea of the divine right of
Kings and led to the establishment of legal limits on the King’s power,
including new limits on the pardon power. In 1689, Parliament enacted the
English Bill of Rights. Among other things, the Bill of Rights provided that
the King could not suspend laws adopted by Parliament. One implication
was that any restriction already in force was now binding and could not be
set aside by the King ruling “non-obstante.” As a result, the King could no
longer suspend the old Pardon Act’s specificity requirement for murder,
rape, and treason.72 Thus, the Bill of Rights “had an indirect effect [on
pardon power] when it prohibited the granting of dispensations, that is, by
66

Evans, supra note 55, at 134–35.
Id.
68
4 CHARLES KNIGHT, THE POPULAR HISTORY OF ENGLAND 208 (New York, John Wurtele Lovell
1st ed. 1880) (discussing religious beliefs of Charles and his brother, James); JOHN MILLER, JAMES II
57–58 (2000) (discussing James’ religious beliefs).
69
TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720, at 1–3
(2007).
70
Until that point, the Catholic sympathies of King Charles and King James seemed a speculative
threat to the Protestant majority. Had Queen Mary died without a son, King Charles’ eldest sister, Mary
Stuart, would have been handed the Crown. Mary was a Protestant, as well as wife of William of Orange.
With James’ birth, it was clear that a Catholic line of Kings was now possible. See id. at 271–72.
71
Id. at 321.
72
This was but one part of the English Bill of Rights’ limitations on the King’s power. The Act also
barred the King from, among other things, “levying money [i.e. taxes] . . . without grant of parliament,”
“raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace,” and interfering with the
“election of members of parliament.” An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and
Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, 7 (Eng.).
67
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declaring it illegal for the Crown to claim . . . the right to disregard the law
in the execution of a particular case.”73
The Bill of Rights also meant that binding restrictions could be imposed
upon the King by Parliament or judicial decision. In 1701, Parliament passed
the Act of Settlement, which revisited the issue raised in the Danby case:
whether the King had the power to pardon an official in an impeachment
hearing. The Act of Settlement explicitly declared that pardons could not be
made to insulate an official from being removed from office through
impeachment. The King could still issue a pardon to insulate the impeached
minister from any criminal penalties that might be imposed during the
proceeding, but that would be the extent of his powers.74 Thus, if a pardon
was granted, the official would lose his position but not his liberty.
D. The Specificity Requirement and the Common Law
The Act of Settlement was a substantive restriction on the pardon power,
in that it excluded a category of cases—impeachment rulings—from the
reach of the pardon power. But other “procedural” restrictions were also
recognized. Identifying the nature of these restrictions is not as easily
described, since the restrictions were not incorporated into a statute. Rather,
the scope of the pardon power can only be identified through a careful
reading of what John Yoo has called the “English Constitution.” That
Constitution, of course, was not written down, but was comprised “of a
series of unwritten principles, expressed in practice, statutes, and
understandings” that existed at the time.75
The Framers, in assessing the scope of the pardon power, would have
referred to this body of law. Specifically, they would have looked to leading
legal authorities of the common law to provide insight into the nature of
those procedural restrictions. The legal rules distilled from these authorities
would thus have “formed the context within which the Framers would have
understood the new Constitution.”76
73

Grupp, supra note 9, at 57.
RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 535 (“[I]n 1700 the act of settlement . . . declared ‘that no
pardon under the great seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.’
. . . [But there] is no doubt that the king can pardon after sentence on an impeachment.”); THOMAS PITT
TASWELL-LANGMEAD & CHARLES HENRY EDWARD CARMICHAEL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 529 (London, Stevens & Haynes 3d
ed. 1886) (“The Act of Settlement . . . declared ‘that no pardon under the Great Seal of England shall be
pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.’ The right of the Crown to reprieve or
pardon after sentence, remains, however, unaffected.”); Duker, supra note 9, at 503 n.152 (“In English
law, although the king could not pardon to block an impeachment, he could pardon subsequent to
impeachment and conviction.”); Grupp, supra note 9, at 57 (“In 1701 the Act of Settlement prohibited
the use of pardon in cases of impeachment although it did not prohibit its use after the impeachment had
been heard.”).
75
YOO, supra note 33, at 31.
76
Id.
74

2020]

PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER

289

Several notable authorities discussed the common law of pardons in the
early eighteenth century in some depth. Of these, the most notable was
William Blackstone, the most influential authority on the common law at
this time.77 Blackstone lived from 1723 until 1780 and published his classic
work, the Commentaries, in the decades before the Constitution was
adopted.78 The Framers were deeply familiar with his work, and key
members of the Constitutional Convention were known to have copies of the
Commentaries in their immediate possession. Among political writings in
America during the founding period, Blackstone was far and away the most
frequently cited authority on the common law.79 He was also among the most
cited common law authorities in the Supreme Court’s major decisions
interpreting the scope of the Pardon Clause.80
In the Commentaries, Blackstone offers a clear statement about the
necessity of naming the particular offense to be pardoned. As he wrote:
“General words have . . . a very imperfect effect in pardons. A pardon of all
felonies will not pardon a conviction . . . (for it is presumed the King knew
not of those proceedings,) but the conviction . . . must be particularly
mentioned.”81 Blackstone’s statement is broad, and it lists no exceptions. It
applies to convictions of all felonies and not simply the most serious crimes
mentioned in the Pardon Act of 1389.82
77
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (“Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as
the most satisfactory expression of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal
Constitution it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work
had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were
familiar with it.”); see also YOO, supra note 33, at 312 n.16 (“Blackstone’s Commentaries had great
appeal for the founding generation as the authoritative treatise on many areas of law.”) (citing GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 10 (1969)).
78
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1765).
79
Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century
American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 (1984). The only other common law
authority in the top ten is Edward Coke (at number ten), who wrote in the seventeenth century, before
the Glorious Revolution. Id. Among all Enlightenment thinkers mentioned in these political writings,
Blackstone is ranked second, trailing close behind Montesquieu. Id.
80
See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111–12 (1925); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65,
69 (1904); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 n.52 (1866); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
307, 311 (1855); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162–63 (1833).
81
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *393 (1769).
82
The Pardon Act of 1389, however, is still operational in one respect. As noted earlier, see supra
text accompanying note 41, the Pardon Act requires the King not only to specify the offense being
pardoned but, at least for murder, to describe the specific way it was carried out. Blackstone clearly
recognized this feature of the Pardon Act. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400 (“[N]o pardon for
treason, murder, or rape shall be allowed unless the offence be particularly specified therein; and
particularly in murder it shall be expressed whether it was committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice
prepense.”). This feature of the Pardon Act does not appear to have been repealed. As a result, after the
English Bill of Rights was adopted, it was binding on the King. In this way, the specificity requirement
was actually two-tiered. For ordinary felonies, the King must specify the particular crime being pardoned.
For the more serious crime of murder, and possibly treason or rape, a “super-particularity” requirement
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Blackstone may be the most influential common law authority of the
eighteenth century, but he is not the sole authority of note. Another was
William Hawkins (1673-1746), who published his major work, Pleas of the
Crown, in 1716.83 Like Blackstone, Hawkins recognized the existence of a
specificity requirement. “It seems to be taken for granted,” he wrote, that a
pardon can be issued for “all Felonies in general, without describing any one
particular Felony.”84 But such a belief, Hawkins continues, is in error, for:
“[I]t hath been holden that the pardon of one who is convicted by verdict of
a felony is not good, unless it recite the indictment and conviction.”85
Other lesser-known authorities on the common law published works in
the eighteenth century, which also affirmed that the King must specify the
offense pardoned. For example, Jacob Giles published his major work, the
Student’s Companion: Or, The Reason of the Laws of England, in 1725.
There, Giles acknowledged that, for the grant of mercy to be valid, “[t]he
offense is to be specified in pardons.”86 Thomas Wood’s treatise, An Institute
of the Laws of England, went through ten editions between 1720 (when it
was first published) and 1774.87 In that work, he wrote that, “A general
pardon of all murders, robberies, etc. to one indicted and convicted of
murder, robbery, etc. is not good, without recital of the indictment and
conviction. For it shall be intended that the King knew not of that
conviction.”88 The bottom line is that, according to leading authorities at the
applied. The King not only had to specify the crimes to be pardoned, he also had to specify the general
way in which the crimes were carried out.
83
1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR A SYSTEM OF THE
PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS (1716).
Like Blackstone, Hawkins was one of the most frequently cited common law authorities in Supreme
Court decisions on the scope of the Pardon Clause. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925);
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 n.52 (1866); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311–
12 (1855); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161–62 (1833).
84
1 HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 383. Note that here and elsewhere I have corrected common law
spelling and capitalization to conform with modern usage (e.g., I have changed “f” to “s” where
appropriate).
85
Id.
86
GILES JACOB, THE STUDENT’S COMPANION: OR, THE REASON OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140
(1725) (“The King, by the Common Law, had Power to Pardon all Offences; but this Power hath been
restrained by Statute, particularly in Cases of Murder. He may still Pardon Treason, Felony,
Manslaughter, Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Fines and Forfeitures incurr’d by such Offences; And the
King may also Restore Corruption of Blood to the Family of the Offenders, by his Act of Pardon. But in
Cases of Wilful Murder, to Pardon an Offender is contrary to the Laws of God and Man; And where an
Appeal may be brought by the Subject, by the Laws of England, a Murderer could never be Pardon’d.”).
Interestingly, Jacob concludes that in the case of homicide, the King is absolutely barred from
pardoning murder absent a showing of self-defense or accident (i.e., it is not sufficient to specify with
particularity how the murder occurred). See id. (“Our Statutes enjoin that no Charter of Pardon be Granted
for Murder, but only where one Killeth another in his own Defence, or by Misadventure.”).
87
All citations here are to the Fourth Edition (corrected), which was published in 1724. THOMAS
WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (J. Watts corrected ed. 1724).
88
Id. at 636. Elsewhere, he makes the seemingly contradictory claim the King may, under some
circumstances, issue general pardons. See id. at 637 (“Pardons . . . are either General or Particular.
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time, a specificity requirement existed in the common law. As a result,
pardons that failed to specify the applicable offenses were deemed invalid.
On what basis was the specificity requirement adopted? The common
law authorities were not always clear on the matter. One factor, certainly,
was the historical practice at the time. As Hawkins noted, vague and general
pardons were exceedingly rare in the common law. Those issued were either
of older origin, or made by an Act of Parliament, not the King.89
Legal practice alone, however, did not ground the specificity
requirement. The requirement was seen, in part, as a natural extension of
rules designed to curb the accidental or abusive use of pardons.90 Most
obviously, it was a direct extension of the Pardon Act of 1389 itself. That
Act, recall, required the King to announce when he was pardoning a serious
crime, like murder.91 The rule was understood to serve a deterrence goal; it
would dissuade the King from issuing pardons for illicit or improper
motives.92 Of course, the Pardon Act was limited in scope: it applied only to
General, either by the Act of Parliament or By Charter of the King.”). But that statement can be reconciled
with the ban on vague pardons by construing the support for general pardons to apply only to preemptive
pardons—pardons made before indictment. See id. at 636 (“But if the Party is neither indicted or
Attainted, A Pardon of all Felonies in General (except as the Statute of Rich. 2 above-mentioned is
excepted) is Good.”).
89
1 HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 384 (General pardons “have been of late Years very rarely granted
by the Crown, without a particular Description of the Offence intended to be pardoned.”). Hawkins
recognizes that some contrary precedents can be found in ancient collections of cases, but that these have
been superseded by more recent practice. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN: OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER
PROPER HEADS 535 (London, Law Booksellers and Publishers, 8th ed. 1824). Hawkins continues:
As to the Precedents of such general Pardons in Rastal’s Entries [a collection of
fifteenth century cases], it may be answered, that their Authority seems to be of less
weight when compared with those many precedents of pardons in the Register, every
one of which particularly describes the offence which is pardoned, and even those
which relate to homicide by lunatics, or infants, or in self-defence, etc. except only
one which pardons escapes, but expressly excepts all voluntary ones. And therefore
where the books speak of pardons of all felonies in general as good, perhaps it may
be reasonable for the most part to intend that they either speak of a pardon by
parliament, or that they suppose that the particular crime is mentioned in the pardon,
though they do not express it.
Id.
90

Deterring the accidental and abusive employment of pardons has long been seen as the core goal
of the specificity requirement. As one American court put it, there has always been a specificity
requirement for two basic reasons: “(1) to assure that the pardon will be given effect only with respect to
the offense intended to be pardoned, and (2) to protect the citizenry against executive irresponsibility.”
Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 386 (Ky. 2006).
91
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400.
92
Blackstone, citing Coke, explained that in adopting the Pardon Act, “it was not the intention of
the parliament that the king should ever pardon murder under these aggravations; and therefore they
prudently laid the pardon under these restrictions, because they did not conceive it possible that the king
would ever excuse an offence by name, which was attended with such high aggravations. And it is
remarkable enough, that there is no precedent of a pardon in the register for any other homicide than that
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the most serious crimes (and it was limited in its effect, since the King could
suspend the rules).93 These limitations reflected Parliament’s limited powers
to control the King’s authority prior to the Glorious Revolution.
Nonetheless, as Parliament gained the upper hand over the King, it was
natural to expand the scope of the rule. If specificity could deter abusive
pardons for serious crimes, why not expand it to the full range of felonies?
The specificity requirement of the eighteenth century thus strengthened the
deterrence effect, applying the rule to all crimes, not just the most serious
ones.
This was not the only basis for an expanded specificity requirement.
Under long-held common law principles, a pardon would be deemed void if
it could be shown that the King was uninformed, misinformed, or deceived
about the facts of a case.94 This rule reflected the basic idea that only a
pardon given intentionally, with full knowledge of the circumstances, is
valid.95
A broad specificity requirement was seen as a useful prophylactic rule
to counter the danger of an unintentional pardon. A vague, non-specific
pardon, for example, might be employed to vacate crimes that were not
within the King’s contemplation or intent. Thus, in defending the specificity
requirement, Hawkins wrote, “where the king in truth intends only to pardon
one felony, which may be very proper for his mercy, he may by consequence
pardon the greatest number of the most heinous crimes, the least of which,
had he been apprised of it, he would not have pardoned.”96 To avoid the
danger of unintended pardons, a royal decree of mercy must be construed
narrowly.97 It must be limited to crimes expressly mentioned in the pardon.98
which happens se defendendo [in self-defense] or per infortunium [by accident] . . . .” Id. at *400–01.
93
Id. at *400.
94
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *400 (“[I]t is a general rule that wherever it may reasonably
be presumed the king is deceived, the pardon is void. Therefore any suppression of truth, or suggestion
of falsehood, in a charter of pardon will vitiate the whole; for the king was misinformed.”); 2 HAWKINS,
supra note 89, at 557 (It “be agreed, That if it appears from the recital of a pardon, that the king was
misinformed either as to the nature of the case, or the proceedings thereupon, the pardon is void; as where
the king pardons a man for felony whereof he stands indicted, or indicted and attainted, and in truth he
never was indicted . . . .”).
95
See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 89, at 542 (“It seems to be laid down as a general rule in many books,
that wherever it may be reasonably intended that the king, when he granted such pardon, was not fully .
. . apprised both of the heinousness of the crime, and also how far the party stands convicted thereof upon
record, the pardon is void, as being gained by imposition upon the king.”).
96
Id. at 543.
97
Hawkins made clear that the specificity requirement was grounded on this rule against
uninformed pardons. As he writes, any claim that general pardons are permissible is not “easy to reconcile
with the general rules concerning pardons, agreed to be good in other cases; for if a felony cannot be well
pardoned where it may be reasonably intended that the king, when he granted the pardon, was not fully
apprised of the state of the case, much less doth it seem reasonable that it should be pardoned where it
may be well intended that he was not apprised of it at all.” Id. at 534.
98
See id. at 535 (“It seems a settled rule, that no pardon of felony shall be carried farther than the
express purport of it . . . .”).
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The specificity requirement, in short, advanced goals already embedded
in the common law—goals designed to reduce the number of abusive and
accidental pardons issued by the King. Those goals existed in limited form
in the common law prior to the eighteenth century, reflecting the King’s
dominant position in English society during that time. But as the King’s
power declined, the dangers of an unfettered pardon power could be more
openly addressed. Rather than a kingly prerogative, the pardon power could
be seen as an extraordinary remedy that posed a danger to the public interest
by its careless or, worse, abusive employment. An expansive specificity
requirement was one key remedy, and it applied to all felonies without
exception.99
E. The Common Law and the Constitution
The common law provides strong support for a specificity requirement,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s originalist approach to the pardon
power. But support for the requirement is further buttressed by the
recognition that the pardon power sits awkwardly within America’s
constitutional scheme. Without appropriate limitations, the pardon power
conflicts with democratic values, rule of law principles, and due process
concerns that lie at the heart of the constitutional order.
The tension with democratic values is plain. The American revolution
represented a decisive break with monarchy.100 The ultimate source of
authority in the new nation would be the people, not the King. Pardons, in
this context, are out of place, authorizing the executive to override the will
of the people. As one author explained, “[i]n a monarchy, a crime is a crime
against the King, who alone has the power to pardon. But in a democracy, a
crime offends against the people. Who can pardon a crime, then, except the
people themselves?”101 It is precisely for this reason that many early and
influential commentators, including Montesquieu and Blackstone, raised
questions about the compatibility of the pardon power with democracy.102
99

Of course, in assessing the common law, nothing is entirely free from doubt. The precise meaning
of terms is not always clear to us, and at least one case from immediately before the Glorious Revolution
suggests that non-specific pardons might be sufficient. See Dominus Rex & Brownfield, Pardon, in 84
THE ENGLISH REPORTS: KING’S BENCH DIVISION 853 (Edinburgh, William Green & Sons 1908) (1685)
(“The Court . . . conceived that a general pardon of all felonies and burglaris . . . is sufficient, without
particular recital of the indictment, which was mistaken . . . and the pardon was allowed.”). But the vast
weight of opinion—including leading writers like Blackstone and Hawkins—indicates that a specificity
requirement existed in the common law at the time of the Constitution’s drafting.
100
See, e.g., 1 THOMAS PAINE, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 70 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed.,
New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) (“But where, say some, is the King of America? I’ll tell you,
friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Great Britain. . . .
For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there
ought to be no other.” (emphasis added)).
101
KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 24 (1997).
102
For example, William Blackstone wrote that, “In democracies, . . . this point of pardon can never
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Beyond its potentially undemocratic features, an unfettered pardon
power also conflicts with rule of law values. Those values require laws to be
publicly articulated, clearly defined, and applied consistently across society.
An unregulated pardon power undermines these goals. As one commentator
put it, such a power represents not so much discretionary justice, but justice
in “derogation of law.”103 The danger of an unchecked discretionary power
would have been plain to the Framers, who fought to counter the arbitrary
or abusive power of English Kings.
Finally, and more narrowly, vaguely-drafted pardons undermine due
process principles. As the Supreme Court has indicated, acceptance of a
pardon represents the acknowledgement of guilt.104 In ordinary criminal
cases, due process requires the defendant to know the crimes he is pleading
guilty to. Thus, a court will refuse to accept a guilty plea without making
sure “the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge” and the consequences of the plea.105 The same principle extends to
pardon cases. A defendant must know the specific crimes he is admitting to
when utilizing a pardon.
These concerns illustrate the anomalous position that the pardon power
has in our constitutional scheme. This is not to conclude that pardons are
without all justification. The Framers understood that pardons could be
employed for public-spirited purposes, to grant mercy to deserving offenders
or to mitigate the harsh consequences of criminal laws.106 It is for these
reasons that the Constitution grants the President authority to issue pardons
in the first place. But the tension with democratic, rule of law, and due
process principles means that pardons are properly seen as extraordinary
subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the laws: and it
would be impolitic for the power of judging and of pardoning to centre in one and the same person.” 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *397. Montesquieu, one of the most influential theorists of the founding
period, made a similar point. See MOORE, supra note 101, at 24 (“In France, for example, Montesquieu
made it clear that he had no objection to pardons in principle. In fact, they could be useful as a way of
making the punishment fit the particular crime. But in a republic, Montesquieu declared, there could be
no pardon.”). Montesquieu was the most cited theorist among the Framers during the period leading up
to the constitutional debates. See Lutz, supra note 79, at 193 (listing Montesquieu as the most cited
political theorist among those mentioned in the Framers’ writings).
103
As one treatise author wrote, “Pardons, being in derogation of law, to be valid and of effect
must accurately describe the offense intended to be forgiven.” RULING CASE LAW, supra note 15, at 548.
104
Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915). See also 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 228 (1865)
(“There can be no pardon where there is no actual or imputed guilt. The acceptance of a pardon is a
confession of guilt, or of the existence of a state of facts from which a judgment of guilt would follow.”).
105
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 n.3 (1970) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11) (“The
court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea . . . without first addressing the
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”).
106
The Framers certainly understood the benefit of mercy in select cases. Alexander Hamilton
emphasized that ameliorating the harshness of the laws was one argument for the pardon power; the need
to reconcile combatants through well-timed amnesties was another. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander
Hamilton).
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remedies. It also means that modest rules that can help counter abusive,
haphazard, and unintentional pardons are fully consistent with this
constitutional structure.
In this regard, the specificity requirement is a well-tailored tool for
mitigating the most problematic features of the pardon power, while
preserving a broad sphere for the exercise of executive discretion. As a
preliminary matter, the requirement does not establish substantive
limitations on the kinds of offenders or the types of crimes that might be
pardoned, thereby leaving a wide field for the President. At the same time,
the requirement helps to counteract some of the worst excesses of the power.
By requiring the President to identify the specific offenses pardoned, the
requirement advances democratic values by providing the public and the
political branches with critical information needed to evaluate the propriety
of the pardon. The requirement promotes due process values by ensuring
that defendants know what they are confessing to. And it promotes rule of
law values by deterring the haphazard or abusive use of executive power.
The requirement is, thus, carefully structured to advance constitutional
values, without interfering with the pardon power’s more benign goals.107
III. OBJECTIONS
The argument in support of a specificity requirement has been grounded
on a careful reading of the common law and the Constitution’s core values.
The argument, however, potentially faces two objections—one based on the
text of the Constitution, the other based on historical practice. Both warrant
careful attention.

107
One counterargument is that the Framers adopted a different remedy for abusive pardons—
impeachment. Unlike the King of England, an American President can be removed from office if he
misuses the pardon power. Given the availability of presidential impeachment, this argument goes,
additional curbs are unnecessary. This argument, which might be superficially plausible, is ultimately
unpersuasive.
As a preliminary matter, there is no evidence that the Framers wanted impeachment to override the
common law’s prophylactic requirement. Given the Supreme Court’s repeated statements that the pardon
power incorporates common law limitations, one would expect some indication from the drafters that
they intended to override the specificity requirement. There is no such evidence. Rather, the similarities
in language between the English Act of Settlement and the Constitution’s Pardon Clause suggests that
the Framers sought to mirror British law and practice, not abolish common law limitations sub silentio.
See Duker, supra note 9, at 501 (noting similarities in language).
Moreover, it is misguided to view impeachment as a substitute for the specificity requirement.
Impeachment is an extreme remedy. It may deter Presidents from using the pardon power in the most
egregious situations, but it does not address lesser misuses of the pardon power, nor does it address the
danger that a broad, vaguely-worded pardon might apply beyond the President’s intent. Most importantly,
the specificity requirement, rather than conflicting with the impeachment mechanism, actually supports
it. Since impeachment is principally a political remedy, it requires some ability for the political branches
to police the executive. Transparency promotes that goal in publicity function. By exposing the scope of
the pardon, the political branches can see what is being pardoned and can act accordingly.

296

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

A. The Textual Objection
The first objection focuses on the language of the Pardon Clause itself.
According to various commentators, the text of the Constitution reveals only
two limitations: pardons cannot be used in impeachment cases or in state
prosecutions. By identifying these two restrictions in the text, the Framers
implied that none other exists. As John Yoo and Saikrishna Prakash affirm,
the “text shows that the Framers knew how to make exceptions to the pardon
power,” and if they meant to impose any additional constraints, the Framers
would have done so in the text.108
This argument faces several problems. The first is that it rests on a rule
of statutory construction that is not a firm rule at all. The principle, called
“expressio unius” in Latin, stands for the proposition that the expression of
one thing suggests the exclusion of others. Thus, according to that rule, if
two exceptions are listed in the text, the Framers intended no other
limitations to apply.
The initial difficulty, as David Golove, has put it, is that “drawing the
expressio unius inference can be a risky venture. In constitutional
adjudication, the Court has sometimes applied the canon, but it has often
explicitly rejected it.”109 Numerous other theorists have made similar
points.110 Perhaps the most famous is Alexander Hamilton, who warned
against using the maxim in an unthinking manner.111
More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
textual limitations were not intended to eliminate other “implicit” limits on
the pardon power, including common law limits.112 To believe otherwise,

108

John Yoo & Saikrishna Prakash, For Trump, Self-Pardon Would Equal Self-Immolation, PHILA.
INQUIRER (July 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www2.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/for-trumpself-pardon-would-equal-self-immolation-20170727.html.
109
David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1815–16 (1998)
(footnotes omitted). As Golove points out, numerous Supreme Court cases have rejected the rigid
application of the rule. See id. at 1815 n.85 (collecting cases).
110
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 653–
54 n.30 (1996) (“[T]he expressio unius maxim of inference by negative implication must be applied
sensitively and contextually; sometimes a negative implication makes the most sense of a clause,
sometimes not.”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 237 n.99
(1945) (“The general view has been that the maxim of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius
has no validity as a canon of constitutional construction.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221,
1273 (1995) (noting limitations of statutory rule).
111
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (affirming maxim should only be used when
reason and common sense suggest it is appropriate).
112
See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 263–64 (1974) (“In light of the English common law from
which such language was drawn, the conclusion is inescapable that the pardoning power was intended to
include the power to commute sentences on conditions which do not in themselves offend the
Constitution, but which are not specifically provided for by statute.”).
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one would have to reject the Supreme Court’s repeated statements that the
Pardon Clause should be interpreted in light of common law practice.113
Ex parte Grossman offers one of the clearest statements to this effect.
After discussing the English origins of the Pardon Clause, the Court affirmed
the continuing validity of common law limits:
We have given the history of the clause to show that the words
“for offences against the United States” were inserted by a
Committee on Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon
of the President was to operate upon offenses against the
United States as distinguished from offenses against the
States. It cannot be supposed that the Committee on Revision
by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them,
intended sub silentio to narrow the scope of a pardon from one
at common law or to confer any different power in this regard
on our Executive from that which the members of the
Convention had seen exercised before the Revolution.114
Moreover, application of expressio unius would run contrary to Supreme
Court precedent,115 which has identified various implicit limitations on the
Pardon Clause, including rules that a pardon must be accepted and then
pleaded to be valid.116

113
See, e.g., id. at 262 (“The history of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent pattern
of adherence to the English common-law practice.”); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 112 (1925)
(discussing the “authoritative background of the common law”).
114
Grossman, 267 U.S. at 113. The rest of the Court’s statement here deserves mention as well:

Nor is there any substance in the contention that there is any substantial difference in
this matter between the executive power of pardon in our Government and the King’s
prerogative. The courts of Great Britain were called the King’s Courts, as indeed they
were; but for years before our Constitution they were as independent of the King’s
interference as they are today. The extent of the King’s pardon was clearly
circumscribed by law and the British Constitution, as the cases cited above show. The
framers of our Constitution had in mind no necessity for curtailing this feature of the
King’s prerogative in transplanting it into the American governmental structures, save
by excepting cases of impeachment; and even in that regard, as already pointed out,
the common law forbade the pleading a pardon in bar to an impeachment. The
suggestion that the President’s power of pardon should be regarded as necessarily less
than that of the King was pressed upon this Court and was agreed to by Mr. Justice
McLean, one of the dissenting Judges, in Ex parte William Wells, 18 Howard, 307,
321, but it did not prevail with the majority.
Id.
115
See Clifton Williams, “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 193
(1931) (explaining the rule of construction that “the expression of one subject, object, or idea is the
exclusion of other subjects, objects, or ideas”).
116
See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 155–56, 161 (1833) (“[T]he court cannot give
the prisoner the benefit of the pardon, unless he claims the benefit of it, and relies on it by plea or motion.
. . . [A] general plea of not guilty, was equivalent to a refusal to accept it.”).
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The Court has made it absolutely clear, in short, that the rule of statutory
interpretation is inapplicable in the pardon context and that the pardon power
is limited by both explicit textual restrictions and implicit common law rules.
That view is the only one consistent with Supreme Court rulings and the text
of the Constitution.
One might still wonder why the Framers included several textual
limitations rather than relying entirely on common law practices. The most
plausible explanation is that the Framers incorporated textual limitations in
those cases where there were questions about the applicability of common
law rules. Consider, for example, the textual provision restricting the pardon
power to “offenses against the United States.”117 Absent that clause,
uncertainty would exist about the applicability of the pardon power to state
crimes, and reliance on the common law would yield no clear answer. The
English system, after all, did not have a similarly structured federal system.
Given that potential ambiguity, the Framers quite reasonably concluded
that a specific textual limitation would be needed to make clear that the
pardon power did not extend to state crimes. Doing so did not signify a desire
to preempt the common law; it simply reflected the realization that the
common law was silent or ambiguous in this area.
A similar issue arises in the case of pardons during impeachment
proceedings. Once again, without a textual limitation, the Pardon Clause
would be unclear.118 The text would simply read: “The President shall have
the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States.”119 The text, at least on one reading, would not prohibit the use of
pardons in impeachment cases. True, the common law has something to say
about this matter. The Act of Settlement bars the use of pardons to prevent
an official’s removal from office during impeachments.120 But the Act of
Settlement does not prohibit the use of pardons during impeachment cases
entirely. As noted earlier, the Act still permits the King to issue a pardon to

117

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. (“[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” (emphasis added)).
119
Id.
120
Act of Settlement 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
aep/Will3/12-13/2 (“That no Pardon under the Great Seal of England be pleadable to an Impeachment
by the Commons in Parliament.”).
118
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vacate criminal penalties issued during impeachments, but pardons could not
be used to bar removal from office.121
This nuanced common law rule reflected a unique feature of English
impeachments. Those proceedings could result, not just to an official’s
removal from office, but in additional criminal penalties as well.122 This is
quite different from the American system, where impeachments can only
result in the removal from office (i.e., criminal penalties could not be
authorized).123
Absent specific guidance in the text of the Constitution, one might
plausibly contend that the common law rule did not apply to the American
scheme, given the different outcomes in English and American
impeachment proceedings. As a result, without a textual limit, the
Constitution could be read to authorize the President to issue pardons in
impeachment cases.
This may not be the most persuasive reading of how the Act of
Settlement applies to the constitutional scheme. But it is at least a plausible
reading. Given the potential for confusion, it made sense for the Framers to
include explicit textual guidance in Article II about the validity of pardons
in impeachment cases.
121

The unique features of the royal pardon power were plainly understood by the Framers and were
mentioned in the debates over the Pardon Clause. Duker, supra note 9, at 501. In one of the few exchanges
on the pardon power at the Convention, James Iredell observed that, in England, the King’s pardon “is
not pleadable in bar of an impeachment. But he may pardon after conviction, even on an impeachment;
which is an authority not given to our President, who in case of impeachments has no power either of
pardoning or reprieving.” Id. at 502 (quoting PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
350–51 (P. Ford ed., 1968)).
The Framers took those differences into account when drafting the Pardon Clause. Id. Initially, the
Pardon Clause mirrored the language of the English Act of Settlement, in stating that a pardon “shall not
be pleadable in bar of an impeachment.” Id. at 501. The language made sense in the English system,
where impeachment proceedings could lead to both removal from office and criminal penalties. Id. at
503. The Act of Settlement language suggested that a pardon could not insulate an offender from removal
by impeachment, but it could protect him from criminal penalties. Id. at 496.
In the American system, impeachment proceedings resulted only in removal from office. See id. at
503 (“In England, impeachment extend[ed] not only to removal from office but also to the more severe
forms of punishment.”). Thus, the Framers could say categorically that pardons were not available in
impeachment cases. And that is the way the Pardon Clause ultimately read, affirming that pardons were
permitted, “except for impeachment.” See id. at 503 n.152 (“It was the more lenient extent of the
impeachment power in America that motivated the insertion of the word ‘except’ for the phrase ‘in bar
of’ . . . .”). The Supreme Court later observed that, while the Pardon Clause is based on the Act of
Settlement, it “is an improvement upon the same.” Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 312 (1856).
122
Duker, supra note 9, at 503. The Danby affair was an illustration of that power; in that case,
Parliament voted both to remove Danby from office and to impose criminal penalties upon him. Id. at
487–96.
123
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under
the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”). Criminal penalties, thus, could not be imposed as part
of the impeachment proceeding, though they could be imposed in a separate criminal prosecution. Id.
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That explicit language did not signify that the Framers meant to exclude
common law rules. It simply meant that, in situations where the common
law was uncertain, the Framers understood it would be prudent to include
textual guidance. In other cases, where the relevance of common law rules
was clear, the Framers expected those rules to be incorporated into the text
of the pardon power without qualification.124
B. The Objection from Historical Practice
The second objection takes a different form, focusing on arguments
from historical practice. Here the claim is that Presidents have repeatedly
issued non-specific pardons throughout American history. That practice, the
argument goes, justifies a new constitutional rule that overrides the original
meaning of the Pardon Clause.
The argument from historical practice is not frivolous on its face. Case
law supports the idea that historical practice is a relevant factor when
interpreting the Constitution in certain kinds of cases—particularly in
separation of powers cases. 125 In these situations, a longstanding,
unchallenged practice deserves deference, since it signifies the existence of
a consensus view about the appropriate distribution of power.126 That
doctrine certainly seems relevant here, given that the pardon power almost
certainly implicates separation of powers concerns.127
124
Duker, supra note 9, at 529. This interpretation gains further credibility when one considers
what the Framers would have needed to do to achieve the same results had the expressio unius rule of
statutory interpretation applied. Namely, they would have had to specify the relevant common law rules
in a comprehensive manner. The result would have been a long, unwieldy provision that would have run
counter to their aspiration to draft a Constitution with a concise statement of governing principles. The
choice they made—to rely on common law principles with clarifying textual rules—was eminently
reasonable.
125
This view can be traced back to the earliest Supreme Court cases: In McCulloch v. Maryland,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that, “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause and
human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned,
but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted;
if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that
practice.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Recent separation of powers cases have relied—to greater
or lesser extent—on constitutional practice. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015)
(quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014)) (discussing separation of powers); Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. at 514 (“[I]n interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon historical
practice. For one thing, the interpretive questions before us concern the allocation of power between two
elected branches of Government.”).
126
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“The separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to undefined provisions in
the frame of our government. . . . The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore, the way
the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or
legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”).
127
The pardon power, after all, gives the President the authority to suspend or override
congressional rules, serving as a check on excessively punitive legislation. See Rachel E. Barkow,
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This is not to say that the historical practice argument is successful. As
a preliminary matter, this kind of argument is not typically decisive. Where
constitutional commands are clear—either because the text or original intent
of the Framers is plain—historical practice does not control. As the Court
has said, “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.”128 Thus,
historical practice “should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous
provision” alone.129
That is one reason why historical practice arguments are so common in
separation of powers cases. In many of those cases, the Court is called upon
to assess the distribution of authority among the various branches without
clear constitutional guidance. But this also highlights why historical practice
arguments are less relevant in assessing the specificity requirement. Here,
after all, the Framers’ intent is clear: a specificity requirement exists,
grounded in common law practices. As a result, historical practice cannot
justify a new constitutional rule contrary to the Framers’ intent.130
This conclusion suggests courts should give little or no weight to
historical practice when considering the validity of the specificity
requirement. Yet even if such evidence were deemed relevant, historical
practice would offer no basis for rejecting the specificity requirement. This
is so for two independent and fundamental reasons. First, a close look at the
evidence reveals that, in fact, a deeply entrenched historical practice does
Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 829–33 (2015)
(“The Framers and contemporary scholars have also seen the clemency power as a key part of the
separation of powers because it allows the executive to check the legislative and judicial branches.”).
The separation of powers implications of the pardon power are touched upon in the Federalist Papers.
Alexander Hamilton notes in Federalist 74 that: “The criminal code of every country partakes so much
of necessary severity that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). Even the
most refined statutory code, in other words, requires a safety valve to account for exceptional cases.
Even more directly relevant, in at least one case the Supreme Court discussed historical practice
when interpreting the scope of the pardon power. Thus, in Ex parte Grossman, the Court ruled that the
President has the constitutional power to pardon criminal contempts. 267 U.S. 87, 122 (1925). Such a
rule, the Court suggested, was supported, in part, by historical practice. Id. at 118 (“[C]riminal contempts
of a federal court have been pardoned for eighty-five years. In that time the power has been exercised
twenty-seven times.”).
128
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); see also Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–
73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (standing for the same proposition). The Supreme Court has stated in a
different context, the fact “that an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render
that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47
(1969); see also Duker, supra note 9, at 524 (restating the holding from Powell).
129
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130
The Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman is not to the contrary. Grossman, 267 U.S. at
112-13. In Grossman, the Supreme Court relied on historical practice to rule in support of the President’s
authority to pardon contempt. But in that case, the common law and other interpretive tools supported
the conclusion that the President can pardon for contempt. Thus, historical practice was not utilized to
override a clear constitutional rule; it was used as further support for a rule validated by other interpretive
factors, including original intent.
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not exist in support of non-specific pardons. Second, even if such a practice
did exist, it should be discounted because of certain unique features relevant
to the pardon process.
1. No Historical Practice Exists for Non-Specific Pardons
Is there a historical practice in support of vague pardons? That one might
believe the answer is “yes” might not be surprising. After all, the most
famous pardon in recent memory was President Ford’s pardon of Richard
Nixon, which directly violated the specificity requirement. That pardon
absolved Nixon of guilt “for all offenses against the United States which he
. . . has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period
from January 20, 1969 through September 8, 1974.”131
The memory of that pardon might persuade citizens to believe that vague
pardons are a common occurrence. But such an inference would be a
mistake, representing what cognitive theorists call the “availability bias.”132
When certain events are more easily brought to mind, human beings tend to
overestimate their prevalence. 133 In fact, President Ford’s vague pardon was
an exceptional occurrence, not a common event.
A review of pardons during the last eight presidential administrations
makes this clear. Between 1974 and 2018, a total of 2191 pardons were
issued.134 Of these, President Ford’s pardon of Nixon was only one of two
pardon orders that potentially violated the specificity requirement. The other
occurred on Christmas Eve of 1992, when President George H.W. Bush
issued an executive order that pardoned members involved in the
Iran-Contra affair. The group included four individuals who were pardoned
after being convicted (Elliott Abrams, Alan Fiers, Clair George, and Robert
C. McFarlane) and two others who were pardoned after indictment but
before trial (Duane R. Clarridge and Caspar W. Weinberger).
That pardon was written in an unusual manner. It gave a full, complete,
and unconditional pardon to the six defendants “for all offenses charged or
prosecuted by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh or committed by
these individuals and within the jurisdiction of that office.”135 The
non-italicized portion of this language is fully consistent with the specificity
131

Proclamation No. 4311, supra note 7.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 424 (2011).
133
For a concise discussion of this cognitive bias, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of
Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 552–56 (2013) and Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127–28
(1974).
134
Clemency Statistics, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last
updated July 11, 2019). These include pardons granted by Presidents Ford (382 pardons), Carter (534),
Reagan (393), Bush (74), Clinton (396), G.W. Bush (189), Obama (212), and Trump (10, through Aug.
1, 2019).
135
Proclamation No. 6518, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2382 (Dec. 24, 1992) (emphasis added).
132
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requirement, since it limits the pardon to crimes outlined in the indictments
and convictions. But the italicized portion is a different matter. This phrase
encompasses any crime that the special prosecutor might charge within his
jurisdiction in the future. In failing to define the kinds of crimes that might
be pardoned, the language arguably violates the specificity requirement.136
With the Iran-Contra pardons added in, the total number of vague
pardons would still remain vanishingly small. It would mean that, over
forty-four years, seven out of 2191 pardons were problematic.137 That comes
out to .3% over the period.
This number ignores one other category of presidential orders that might
seem relevant to the analysis—general amnesties. Like pardons, amnesties
insulate an offender from criminal liability. They differ from ordinary
pardons in that they are issued to groups of unnamed offenders, rather than
to select, identified individuals.138 Although the word “amnesty” is not
136
Whether it actually violates the specificity requirement is a matter of debate. First, the
questionable language in the pardon is not actually operational, since the offenders had not yet been
charged with additional crimes, and it is not clear that they could have been. Consequently, the additional
language could be viewed as superfluous; a kind of presidential dicta.
Second, President Bush, in issuing the pardons, couched them in terms of rewarding individuals
who carried out hazardous foreign policy and military missions. Indeed, Bush self-consciously situated
the pardon within a list of military amnesties, comparing his order with “James Madison’s pardon of
Lafitte’s pirates after the War of 1812, . . . Andrew Johnson’s pardon of soldiers who had fought for the
Confederacy, . . . [and] Harry Truman’s and Jimmy Carter’s pardons of those who violated the Selective
Service laws in World War II and Vietnam.” See Associate Press, The Pardons; Text of President Bush’s
Statement on the Pardon of Weinberger and Others, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1992),
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/25/us/pardons-text-president-bush-s-statement-pardon-weinbergerothers.html (statement by President Bush when announcing the pardon). As discussed in more detail later
in this Section, these kinds of military pardons or amnesties may be exempt from the specificity
requirement.
137
Database of pardons on file with author. Besides the 2191 pardons discussed above, we also
have relevant information about 2314 pardons from 1961 through 1974 (spanning the administrations of
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon). According to one study, all but three of these pardons were
issued after conviction. See Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of
Information, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 191 n.160 (1999) (citing A Pardon for Nixon and Watergate Is Back,
CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 14, 1974, at 2458). For the post-conviction pardons, it is reasonable to assume
that the President knew of the specific charges and either explicitly referred to the charges in the relevant
indictments or at least implicitly limited the pardons to those charges. We do not know if the three
pre-conviction pardons satisfied the specificity requirement. But even if all three were vaguely worded,
the percentage of non-specific pardons during this period would be miniscule: .1% over the entire period.
138
See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601–02 (1896) (noting that an amnesty “is rarely, if
ever, exercised in favor of single individuals, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons,
who are subject to trial, but have not yet been convicted”); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153
(1877) (“[T]he term [amnesty] is generally employed where pardon is extended to whole classes or
communities, instead of individuals . . . .”); United States v. Hall, 53 F. 352, 355 (W.D. Pa. 1892)
(“Pardons are granted to individual criminals by name; amnesty to classes of offenders or communities.
They differ, not in kind, but solely in the number they severally affect.”); see also Samuel T. Morison,
Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 291 (2010) (“Analytically,
an amnesty is not really a separate form of relief under the Pardon Clause, but merely signifies a pardon
extended to an entire class of unnamed persons falling within the specific terms of the grant, typically
enacted by a means of a presidential proclamation, rather than a clemency warrant issued to one or more
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mentioned in the Constitution, courts have ruled that amnesties are
authorized under the Pardon Clause of the Constitution.139 In effect,
amnesties are a special kind of pardon.
Since amnesties have the same legal roots as pardons, they would seem
relevant to our discussion of pardon practices. But including amnesties in
the analysis does not change the conclusion. Out of a total of approximately
thirty amnesties, twenty specify the offenses covered by the order and thus
are fully consistent with the specificity requirement.140 Two more implicitly
limit the scope of the pardon to specific offenses.141 Finally, one pardon was
enacted pursuant to a treaty, thus resting on independent constitutional
grounds.142 That leaves only seven amnesties that lack references to specific
offenses (i.e., conflict with the specificity requirement). If all seven were
treated as vague pardons, the total number of vague pardons would still be a
tiny amount—a total of fourteen pardons out of 2191 (or .6%).
At the same time, the appropriateness of looking to amnesties as a point
of reference is questionable. Although both amnesties and individual
pardons are rooted in the same constitutional provision, they have important
differences.143 The most fundamental difference, for our purposes, concerns
the kinds of offenses for which amnesties typically apply. Amnesties are
almost always issued for offenses relating to military conflict.144 Thus, they
identifiable grantees.”); Henry Weihofen, Legislative Pardons: Another View, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 387,
391 (1939) (“The difference between amnesty and pardon—‘general’ or ‘special pardon,’ if one likes—
lies . . . in the character of the act. The [pardon] remits punishment to a named person. The [amnesty]
remits punishment for an offense, without particular reference to those who committed it.”).
139
20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 332 (1892) (Amnesties “only enable[] [the President] to do that in one
act which he might do by a thousand. The power which the Executive exercises is still the pardoning
power, and that the Constitution gives him.”). The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say, in dicta, that
the “distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance.” Brown, 161 U.S. at 601; see
also Knote, 95 U.S. at 153 (“[T]he distinction between [amnesty and pardon] is one rather of philological
interest than of legal importance.”).
140
See infra Appendix A.
141
See Proclamation (Dec. 8, 1863), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 213, 213–15 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (proclamation by President
Lincoln asserting that amnesty is limited to the crime of treason, given the preamble’s language referring
to both treasons explicitly and to earlier statutes that identify treason as the focus of concern);
Proclamation (May 29, 1865), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
1789-1897, supra, at 310, 310–11 (proclamation by President Andrew Johnson indicating that amnesty
refers to and mirrors Lincoln’s earlier amnesty of December 8, 1863, and so similar limitations
presumably apply). Cf. In re Stetler, 22 F. Cas. 1314, 1315 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1852) (No. 13,380) (showing
that the preamble of a pardon is relevant in assessing pardon’s scope).
142
Treaty with the Cherokees, Cherokees-U.S., art. II, Aug. 6, 1846, 9 Stat. 871.
143
Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94–95 (1915) (“They are of different character and have
different purposes.”). For example, the Court has explained, an amnesty “overlooks the offense,” while
“remit[ting] punishment.” Id. One possible implication is that acceptance of a pardon implies acceptance
of guilt, while the application of an amnesty does not.
144
Amnesty, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 37 (1930) (“[A]mnesties of a general
nature usually follow civil disturbances which have threatened the government . . . .”); Morison, supra
note 138, at 291 (“Presidents have utilized this mechanism of pardon relief repeatedly throughout
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are commonly used to reconcile combatants after fighting, absolve a
deserter of guilt,146 or show gratitude to soldiers who have fought in battle.147
Amnesties of this sort directly or indirectly implicate the President’s
Article II commander-in-chief powers. These powers lie at the very heart of
executive authority.148 For this reason, amnesties deserve a particularly
deferential kind of review and, arguably, should be exempted from
procedural rules pertaining to pardons, including the rule that a pardon
satisfy the specificity requirement.149
Though this conclusion has never been tested in the Supreme Court, at
least one circuit court has reached a similar conclusion, albeit perhaps for
different reasons. In Greathouse, a federal circuit court observed that, “if a
man be attained of felony, and get a pardon which doth not mention the
attainder, the pardon will be ineffectual.”150 After expressing some
skepticism about the continuing viability of such a rule, the court added that,
regardless, the specificity requirement has no application to a proclamation
of amnesty or general pardon to a number of offenders as a class.151
American history to restore social peace after periods of war and other episodes of political upheaval.”);
Weihofen, supra note 138, at 392 (The purpose of amnesties historically “was similar to that of a treaty
which ends hostilities between different nations when both nations retain their independence. The acts
of amnesty ended hostilities between warring factions, when neither faction was exterminated or
expelled.”). This distinct feature is consistent with the historic uses of the amnesty power, going back to
classical times. See id. at 392 (Amnesties are “Act[s] of Grace” of a special sort, “its use in English
history was precisely the same as in Greek and Roman history. It put an end to rebellion, civil war or
disturbance, in which it was not desired to exterminate or expel all guilty persons.”).
145
E.g., Proclamation No. 483 (July 4, 1902), reprinted in A SUPPLEMENT TO A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1902, at 392, 392–94 (George Raywood Devitt
ed., 1903) (granting amnesty for insurrectionists in Philippines).
146
E.g., Amnesty and Pardon, 43 Stat. 1940 (Mar. 5, 1924) (granting amnesty for certain World
War I deserters).
147
E.g., Proclamation No. 2676, 10 Fed. Reg. 15,409 (Dec. 24, 1945) (granting amnesty for certain
persons active in the armed forces after July 1941).
148
The Framers understood the heightened social interests at play in granting amnesties. In one of
the only substantive discussions of the Pardon Clause in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
justified the President’s broad pardon powers on the grounds that a well-placed amnesty might be
essential for avoiding internal conflict after wartime. As Hamilton wrote: “[T]he principal argument for
reposing the power of pardoning in . . . the chief magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection and
rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth.” THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton); see
also Duker, supra note 9, at 504–05 (explaining the reasoning behind the executive pardon power).
149
The Supreme Court has recognized that different procedural rules apply to amnesties compared
to ordinary pardons. For example, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts should take judicial notice
of amnesties but not pardons. See Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1892) (Granting of amnesty
to Civil War rebels is a “public proclamation of the President, which has the force of public law, and of
which all courts and officers must take notice, whether especially called to their attention or not.”).
150
In re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1059 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1864).
151
Id. at 1060 (“But this reason can have no application to general acts of amnesty and pardon,
which are intended to include whole classes of offenders, and are in no respect founded on any
consideration of the circumstances of particular cases, except of those which by name or special
description may be excepted out of them.”).
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The implication is that amnesties should not be considered as part of the
historical practice relevant to our study, at least when they are issued for
wartime infractions. The only “amnesties” that deserve our attention are
those issued for offenses outside the military and national security
context.152 How many general pardons of this sort exist? Of the roughly
thirty amnesties issued over the nation’s history, only one involves ordinary
criminal activity.
That amnesty occurred in 1917, when President Wilson issued amnesty
for all individuals currently serving a suspended sentence. Those suspended
sentences had all recently been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.153 In his amnesty proclamation, Wilson noted that returning these
individuals to prison would lead to significant hardship and potential
injustice, especially since many seemed to be living blameless lives.154
Particularly relevant for our purposes is the fact that the amnesty was written
in extremely broad language. It applied to any federal offense that generated
a suspended sentence. In that sense, it violated the specificity requirement.
This single example of an amnesty for ordinary criminal activity should
be included in our list of non-specific pardons, rather than the seven
non-specific amnesties mentioned previously. In that case, the total number
of pardons and “amnesties” that involve non-specific offense language falls
to eight out of 2191, or .4%. Needless to say, this is hardly a “systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued.”155 Rather, it is best described
as exceptionally rare.

152

The word “amnesties” is surrounded with quotation marks in the text because the term is used
here solely to refer to offenses relating to military conflict. Under that definition, an executive order
absolving run-of-the-mill crimes for a class of offenders might more accurately be described as a “general
pardon,” rather than an amnesty.
153
See Proclamation of the President of the United States (June 14, 1917), in SUPPLEMENT TO THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS COVERING THE SECOND TERM OF WOODROW WILSON,
MARCH 4, 1917, TO MARCH 4, 1921, at 8318, 8318–19 (1921) (granting amnesty to persons who received
a suspended sentence during a specified period). The amnesty was triggered by a Supreme Court
decision, Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). The case is sometimes referred to as the Killits
decision after the judge who imposed one of the suspended sentences. As the Court in Killits explained,
it has long been the practice of district courts to suspend a sentence indefinitely. Id. at 50–51. Indeed, at
the time of the Killits decision, there were in excess of two thousand persons at large on suspended
sentences, most if not all of whom were convicted of ordinary criminal offenses. Id. at 52. Killits declared
that this practice was illegal, and that courts lacked lawful power to suspend criminal sentences. Id. at
51–52. The implication was that released offenders would be returned to prison.
154
Wilson’s proclamation mirrors the Supreme Court’s own statements in Killits. As the Court
noted, grave concerns had been raised that, as a result of its ruling, “misery and anguish and miscarriage
of justice may come to many innocent persons” by its ruling. The Court responded by stating that a
“complete remedy may be afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power.” Killits, 242 U.S. at 52.
155
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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2. Practical Obstacles to Challenging Pardons
The flaws in the historical practice argument are even greater than these
numbers suggest. Even if one were to conclude, counterfactually, that a large
number of vague pardons were sprinkled throughout American history, that
pattern would still not make the historical practice argument compelling. To
understand this point, we need to clarify why a “systematic, unbroken,
practice” might be relevant in constitutional interpretation.
The standard explanation is that such a pattern suggests a consensus
among the political branches regarding the appropriate distribution of
government power—a consensus that deserves respect when interpreting the
Constitution’s separation of powers requirements.156 In the pardon context,
however, a practice cannot generate such an inference. The reason is that the
political branches lack obvious opportunities or incentives to challenge the
President’s pardon practices. Consequently, the failure to challenge a vague
pardon should not imply a consensus; it may simply reflect a lack of realistic
opportunities to push back.157
Congress, for example, has limited options for challenging executive
pardons. The Supreme Court has stated that pardons are entirely insulated
from congressional control.158 Individual legislators are also powerless to
challenge executive pardons in court, primarily because of strict standing
rules. To bring suit, a legislator would need to “allege the deprivation of a
legislative prerogative, such as nullification of a vote or deprivation of the
opportunity to vote on legislative business.”159 A pardon does neither.160
156
See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology
Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 880–82 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER
(1995)) (The fact that Congresses have repeatedly “failed to object . . . even when [they] had an
opportunity to do so,” creates at least an inference that the body consented to the executive action.
(alterations in original)).
157
One might imagine other scenarios where the opportunity to challenge a practice does not exist.
For example, if an executive action occurs in secret without other branches being aware of it (say, secret
surveillance of citizens), the fact that such a practice has occurred is not grounds for saying that a
consensus among the branches of government exists in support of it.
158
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867).
159
Matthew Hall, Who Has Standing to Sue the President over Allegedly Unconstitutional
Emoluments?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 768 (2017). In effect, standing exists when a plaintiff suffers
an institutional injury that amounts to vote nullification. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823, 826
(1997) (distinguishing between “vote nullification” and “abstract dilution of institutional legislative
power”).
160
Such suits might have a better chance if Congress as a whole brought suit. Such actions are
extremely rare. See ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43712, ARTICLE III STANDING AND
CONGRESSIONAL SUITS AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1 (2014) (standing found only four times in
forty-one years, with three of the four times concerning enforcement of congressional subpoenas).
Some courts have suggested that standing is more likely when legislatures lack any other remedy
to challenge executive practices. Id. at 7–8. This was suggested in Campbell v. Clinton, which involved
a claim that President Clinton’s use of force was a violation of the War Powers Act and his constitutional
authority. 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The D.C. Circuit noted that plaintiffs “enjoy[ed] ample
legislative power to have stopped prosecution of the ‘war’” including the ability to pass a law forbidding
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Congress, of course, might initiate impeachment proceedings to express
its opposition to the President’s failure to observe the specificity
requirement. But that is an extreme remedy, and it seems unrealistic to
expect Congress to take that action each time the President issues a
non-specific pardon, especially in the run-of-the-mill criminal case. Indeed,
given the lack of awareness about the common law limits on the pardon
power, it would be extraordinary if Congress started the complex machinery
of impeachment on the grounds that a pardon violated a procedural rule.161
Congress, in short, has few realistic options to challenge a vague,
non-specific pardon.162
If Congress is poorly positioned to police the boundaries of the
specificity requirement, one might think that it counts for something that the
third branch of government—the federal judiciary—has made virtually no
mention of the specificity requirement in the past 230 years. But this is really
not surprising. Challenges to pardons are extremely rare, for obvious
reasons. The only entities that seem likely to have standing to challenge a
pardon are the two parties to the case—the defendant and the prosecutor.163
the use of U.S. forces or restrict funding for American participation in the conflict through the
appropriations power. Id. at 23. The court also stated that “there always remains the possibility of
impeachment should a President act in disregard of Congress’ authority on these matters.” Id. What
counts as a legislative remedy remains unclear in the pardon context. See DOLAN, supra, at 13–14 (noting
that existing case law has not specifically defined what constitutes a legislative remedy). As a result, this
consideration may cut both ways. On one hand, the legislature always has impeachment as remedy for
challenging improper pardons. On the other hand, short of that extreme remedy, Congress has limited
options.
161
Even if Congress were to initiate impeachment proceedings in more high-profile cases (such as
George H.W. Bush’s pardon of the Iran-Contra conspirators), it would not be clear that this action
signified Congress’ view that the pardon was unconstitutional; rather it might simply reflect a belief that
the pardon was based on illicit motives, an entirely different rationale.
162
Another option might be for Congress to adopt non-binding resolutions declaring a
vaguely-drafted pardon unlawful. Again, in the case of a run-of-the mill pardon, it is highly unlikely for
Congress or its committees to take such a step, and it is not clear that such a resolution would be counted
as part of the relevant historical practice.
One of the few formal efforts to repudiate a presidential pardon occurred soon after the Civil War,
when Andrew Johnson granted amnesty to Confederates fighting the Union armies. Following that
action, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report declaring the amnesty invalid (on the grounds that
the amnesty lacked congressional authorization). S. REP. NO. 40-239, at 2–3 (1869). I am not aware of
any congressional action, however, criticizing pardons on specificity grounds. Given the infrequency of
such pardons, however, that silence may not be entirely surprising.
163
Ordinary members of the public lack standing to bring such a challenge, since they do not have
the kind of concrete injury required to bring suit. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–
74 (1992) (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); McCord v. Ford, 398 F. Supp. 750,
755 (D.D.C. 1975) (“When a President exercises [the] authority to pardon, as he frequently does, his
action . . . cannot be reviewed by a court on the mere complaint of a citizen.” (quoting Koffler v. Ford,
Civil No. 74-1406 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1974))).
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However, except in the most unusual case, the defendant—the recipient of a
pardon—would be loath to challenge a pardon.164 That leaves the prosecutor
as the principal entity in a position to dispute a pardon’s validity. Yet
prosecutors are not the most promising agents for vindicating the specificity
requirement’s relevance.
As a preliminary matter, a prosecutor may have limited standing to bring
a challenge, particularly in cases where the pardon is issued after sentencing.
Whether standing exists in such cases would depend on whether the
prosecutor is seen as having a continuing interest in the case after its
completion. Since most pardons occur after sentencing, this may prove a
significant limitation on the prosecution’s ability to challenge a pardon.165
Even assuming a prosecutor could challenge the validity of a pardon,
she would face significant institutional obstacles in doing so. Prosecutors are
part of the executive branch and formally under the direction of the Attorney
General and, through her, the President.166 A President, concerned about a
disobedient U.S. Attorney, could remove the prosecutor from office. As a
A court could, on its own initiative, review the validity of a pardon, but it is unlikely to do so absent
a motion from the parties themselves or special circumstances. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Unlike probation, pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been
the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”). In
exceptional cases, it is conceivable that a court might, on its own, hold a hearing to review the validity
of a pardon short-circuiting the criminal process supervised by the judge. One example is President
Trump’s pardon of Sheriff Arpaio. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10186,
CAN THE PRESIDENT PARDON CONTEMPT OF COURT? PROBABLY YES. 1–2 (2018) (discussing procedure
leading to review of Arpaio pardon). What made that case unusual is that the pardon implicated the
court’s own enforcement powers, which may explain the court’s belief in its authority to review the
pardon. It remains unclear whether courts have authority to hold such hearings in other pardon cases
where no one challenges the pardon.
164
One of those exceptionally rare circumstances arose in Burdick. For details, see supra note 20.
Burdick appears to be the only Supreme Court case where a defendant challenged the pardon on the
grounds that it lacked appropriate specificity about the offense. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79,
93 (1915). There, the Supreme Court sidestepped that issue, ruling in Burdick’s favor on other grounds.
Id. at 91, 93.
165
There is also the awkward question whether a prosecutor, who is ostensibly representing the
executive branch, has standing to challenge conduct by the President of the United States, the head of the
executive branch. Can the executive branch sue itself? Some precedent from the Watergate era suggests
the answer is yes, under appropriate circumstances. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691–92
(1974) (highlighting the potential legal issues for suing a President for contempt); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1405–08 (1999) (discussing Leon Jaworski’s standing
to sue Richard Nixon).
166
The President retains the ultimate power to fire the Attorney General, as well as individual U.S.
Attorneys. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). Despite this power, individual prosecutors retain a degree of
independence regarding how they pursue investigations. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can
the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2018) (“United States Attorneys
and other subordinate DOJ lawyers are, in theory, subject to the Attorney General’s specific direction,
although, as a practical matter, subordinate prosecutors maintain substantial autonomy . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). Moreover, the legal authority of the President to control the course of specific investigations,
short of firing prosecutors, remains controversial. See id. at 30–31 (discussing Supreme Court decisions
that have questioned limiting the President’s ability to discharge independent prosecutors).
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practical matter, then, it would be highly unusual for an ordinary prosecutor
to challenge a pardon issued by the chief executive of the nation.
The most likely scenario where a challenge would occur would be in
cases involving a special prosecutor of some sort, one who is appointed to
investigate executive branch malfeasance and who, through regulation or
law, maintains some degree of independent prosecutorial authority.167 Few
cases over the nation’s history meet those requirements, if only because
independent or special prosecutors are of relatively recent vintage.168
The two examples that come closest to satisfying these requirements are
the pardons of Richard Nixon and the Iran-Contra conspirators.169 In both
cases, the pardons were issued in the face of special prosecutor
investigations. Additionally, questions arose about whether they were issued
167
Various types of independent prosecutors have been utilized in the past, including “special
prosecutors,” “special counsels,” and “independent counsels.” For a useful glossary of terms, see
CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSEL
INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 2 (2019). In this Article, I use
the term “independent prosecutor” to refer to a federal prosecutor appointed to investigate the executive
branch and who, for political and/or legal reasons, possesses a significant degree of independence from
ordinary Department of Justice oversight. In practice, this encompasses special prosecutors and special
counsel appointed under either the Ethics in Government Act (when in force) or Department of Justice
regulations.
168
Until the Watergate era, the use of independent prosecutors was rare. See KATY J. HARRIGER,
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 41–42 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that Watergate
placed special prosecutors “on the agenda” of Congress). In 1973, pursuant to Department of Justice
guidelines, Attorney General Elliot Richardson appointed special prosecutor Archibald Cox to
investigate allegations of executive abuse. The President subsequently ordered Cox fired, triggering the
so-called Saturday Night Massacre. BROWN & COLE, supra note 167, at 3.
Though legal, the President’s actions carried a heavy political cost and hastened his downfall. To
insulate special prosecutors from presidential control, Congress subsequently enacted the 1978 Ethics in
Government Act. The Act authorized a three-judge panel to appoint a “special prosecutor” (subsequently
called an “independent counsel”) to investigate criminal wrongdoings. The Act proved controversial, and
it was left to expire in 1999. In its stead, the Department of Justice enacted regulations to authorize the
Attorney General to appoint lawyers from outside the government to serve as a “special counsel” in cases
where potential conflicts of interest might exist. Special prosecutors are considered to be somewhat
independent from the rest of the executive branch. Among other things, they are “not subject to ‘day-today supervision’ by any official and are vested ‘within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power
and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States
Attorney.’” BROWN & COLE, supra note 167, at 1.
Robert Mueller was appointed subject to these regulations. Office of Deputy Attorney Gen., Order
No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016
Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/967231/download. While ultimately removable by the President, Mueller enjoyed a degree
of independence, and he remained in the job despite the President’s stated desire to see him removed.
169
In Richard Nixon’s case, a special prosecutor had been appointed to investigate possible
presidential misdeeds. The investigation into Nixon’s crimes was cut short when Ford issued a pardon to
the former President. Macgill, supra note 5, at 61. The pardons in the Iran-Contra case also cut short the
trials of at least two of the six co-conspirators, while freeing the other four from the consequences of
their convictions. See Carl Levin, The Iran-Contra Pardons: Was It Wrong for Ex-President Bush to
Pardon Six Defendants?, 79 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (1993) (explaining the consequences of the pardon and
arguing that the Iran-Contra pardons undermine independent counsels).
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170

for self-serving, improper motives. Of the two, the Nixon pardon was the
most vulnerable to challenge, since it was crafted in exceptionally broad
language.171 Some on Leon Jaworski’s staff reportedly supported contesting
the pardon.172 For unclear reasons, Jaworski chose not to take such a
dramatic step.173
The point of this extended discussion is straightforward: Even if,
counterfactually, one were to find a historical practice in support of
non-specific pardons, one cannot assume this implies an interbranch
consensus on their validity. One can infer such an agreement only when
170
The Iran-Contra pardons were viewed as problematic by some commentators, who saw the
pardons as efforts by President Bush to stymie investigations that might prove embarrassing for the Bush
Administration. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and
Accountability in the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1989) (“[T]he Iran-Contra
episode raises the possibility that a pardon could be motivated by the personal self-interest of the
President who could halt criminal proceedings in order to suppress information about his own
misdeeds.”).
The Nixon pardon was even more controversial, with some going so far as to claim that Ford
reached a deal with Nixon to pardon him in exchange for the presidency. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Gerald
Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349, 361 (2010) (discussing
“suspicions [Ford] had made a deal with Haig,” though ultimately concluding that “[t]hose suspicions
were apparently groundless”); Did Gerald Ford Agree to Nixon Pardon Before Taking Office?,
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 27, 2006), https://www.democracynow.org/2006/12/27/did_gerald_ford_
agree_to_nixon (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (indicating that Victor Navasky, Publisher Emeritus of The
Nation, stated that Ford’s statement regarding Nixon’s pardon was “an attempt to put a gloss of innocence
on a deal they had made”). Others believed that Ford sincerely felt a pardon was in the public interest.
Some of this latter group nonetheless felt he acted prematurely. Richard Ben-Veniste, the former Chief
of the Watergate Taskforce of the Special Prosecutor’s office, took this position. As he explained:

Had Ford kept to his original plan and allowed time for formal charges to be lodged
against Nixon, spelling out the specifics of his culpability, it would have been up to
Nixon to either accept the pardon or fight the charges in court. But pardoning Nixon
without requiring at least an acknowledgment of responsibility for serious misconduct
and for lying to the public left the door open for the spate of revisionist books and
articles that followed the resignation.
Richard Ben-Veniste, The Pardon in History’s Hindsight, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801054.html; see also
Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is Our Cynicism
Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 166–68 (1999) (discussing the impact of pardon on public information
concerning Watergate and related scandals).
171
See Proclamation No. 4311, supra note 7 (demonstrating the broad language of the Nixon
pardon). The Special Prosecutor could have challenged the pardon by indicting the President, requiring
him to plead the pardon in return. That would have provided an opportunity to litigate the pardon’s
validity.
172
Warren Weaver, Jr., Experts Assert Some Nixon Legal Problems Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/10/archives/experts-assert-some-nixon-legal-problemsremain-court-review.html.
173
The special counsel in the Iran-Contra case, Lawrence Walsh, had a more difficult route to
challenging the Bush pardon. To do so, he would have had to file new charges that were not listed in the
specific pardon language. If the defendants then tried to use the pardon to avoid prosecution, Walsh
would have had an opportunity to challenge the pardon order. Of course, this tactic rested on the
assumption that Walsh could have identified additional charges relevant in the case.
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other branches have an opportunity to challenge and dispute the practice.
Indeed, without such an opportunity, unconstitutional practices would
become law simply by being insulated from attack. Presidential pardons
benefit from that kind of insulation as they are largely immune from
legislative control or judicial review.174 Thus, even if we assume for the sake
of argument that a history of vague pardons exists, that practice would
deserve little or no interpretive weight.
IV. DONALD TRUMP AND THE SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT
The specificity requirement is a modest limitation on presidential power.
It requires the President to specify the particular offense that he or she
intends to pardon, either by identifying the crime or by referring to charges
listed in an indictment or conviction. The rule does not prevent the President
from granting mercy to any person or for any crime, and it does not require
a significant change in practice. Presidents have typically satisfied the
requirement when issuing pardons. If that is the case, one may wonder if the
formal adoption of the specificity requirement would be particularly
significant. The answer is that it may in fact prove vitally important, in light
of the increased risk today that pardons will be used for self-interested,
partisan, and corrupt reasons.
Since the 1970s, several controversial pardons have come to the public’s
attention. Two of the most obvious are President Ford’s pardon of Nixon
and President Bush’s pardon of the Iran-Contra defendants. Commentators
have argued, with more or less persuasiveness, that both of these pardons
were made for illicit motives.175 More recently, President Clinton’s pardon
of Marc Rich was widely seen as a payoff to a major campaign
contributor.176
President Trump brings the danger to a new level. In his first year of
office, the President has issued highly questionable pardons to supporters,
such as Dinesh D’Souza and Joe Arpaio. Even more egregiously, he has
threatened to use the pardon power to disrupt investigations into his own,
potentially criminal, conduct. Thus, the President seems to have hinted at
the possibility of offering a pardon to his former campaign chairman, Paul
174

See Maddie McMahon & Jack Goldsmith, The Executive Branch’s Extraordinarily Broad View
of the Presidential Pardon Power, LAWFARE (May 31, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
executive-branchs-extraordinarily-broad-view-presidential-pardon-power (noting that since 1866 the
Supreme Court has held that pardon power is not subject to legislative control and that there is only a
possibility that pardons may be reviewed by courts).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (discussing Ford’s pardon of Nixon and Bush’s
pardon of the Iran-Contra defendants).
176
See, e.g., Editorial, An Indefensible Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A18; E.J. Dionne, Jr.,
Bill Clinton’s Last Outrage; The President’s Defenders Feel Betrayed by His Pardon of Marc Rich,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 6, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/bill-clintons-last-outrage-thepresidents-defenders-feel-betrayed-by-his-pardon-of-marc-rich/.
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Manafort. The purpose of such an offer is not certain, but it appeared to be
motivated by a desire to undercut the Special Counsel’s leverage over
Manafort.177
If the President carries through on these threats, he may be tempted to
issue a broad, non-specific pardon. A vague pardon of this sort—such as a
pardon for “all felonies” committed over a period of time—would leave the
nature of the immunized conduct uncertain.178 In that way, it would create a
fog of ambiguity that could help the President avoid scrutiny and
controversy.179
Given the elevated risk of a self-interested pardon, the specificity
requirement gains heightened significance. The requirement offers a number
of benefits, some of which have been touched on in earlier sections. At a
most basic level, the specificity requirement guards against a pardon that
unintentionally applies to crimes beyond the President’s intent or
knowledge. For example, on a charitable reading, President Trump might
honestly believe that Paul Manafort (or Roger Stone or Michael Flynn) has
been unfairly targeted by the special prosecutor. Even so, if Trump issues a
177

See, e.g., Natasha Bach, Trump’s Latest Tweets Hint at Pardon for Paul Manafort—But Nothing
for Michael Cohen, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/08/22/trump-tweets-manafortcohen/; Telegraph Reporters, Donald Trump Says He’s Considering Pardon for Paul Manafort,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 23, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/23/donald-trumpsays-considering-pardon-paul-manafort/ (discussing President Trump’s potential pardon of Paul
Manafort).
178
This is particularly true when a non-specific pardon is made preemptively (i.e., before
indictment). In that case, knowledge of the offender’s wrongdoings may be particularly obscure,
generating a particularly heavy fog around what precisely is being vacated. Richard Nixon’s pardon was
criticized for precisely this reason, with some arguing that President Ford should have waited until after
indictment to pardon Nixon. That way, the public would have at least been clear about which crimes
Richard Nixon had committed.
Given the ambiguous scope of a preemptive pardon, the Office of Legal Counsel has warned that
such pardons should only be used in the most exceptional cases. Pardoning Power of the President, 6 Op.
Att’y Gen. 20–21 (1853) (“[I]t has been held unwise and inexpedient, as a general rule, to interpose the
pardoning power in anticipation of trial and condemnation, although particular circumstances may exist
to justify such an exceptional act on the part of the President.”). Tellingly, the Attorney General’s Office
has also stated that, when preemptive pardons are issued, details of the recipients’ crimes and guilt should
be articulated. Id. (“The President of the United States has, undoubtedly, the power to grant a pardon as
well before conviction as afterwards. . . . But there must be satisfactory evidence of some kind as to the
guilt of the party.”). Current Department of Justice regulations go even farther, stating that:
No petition for a pardon should be filed until . . . at least five years after the date of
the release of the petitioner from confinement or, in case no prison sentence was
imposed, until the expiration of a period of at least five years after the date of the
conviction of the petitioner.
Eligibility for Filing Petition for Pardon, 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1999).
179
Duker, supra note 9, at 504. As William Duker has observed, those arguing for an unfettered
pardon power fail “to recognize the disadvantages connected with secrecy and the pardoning power: ‘If
the history of civilization proves nothing else, it proves that where secrecy cloaks the use of power it also
cloaks the abuse of power.’” Id.
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pardon for “all crimes” committed over a period of time, he may end up
absolving the recipient of crimes of which Trump was not aware.
The more serious concern, of course, is that Trump is well aware of the
crimes committed by his associates and wants to issue a pardon to protect
himself from investigation. In that circumstance, a specificity requirement
would serve an essential function. By requiring the President to be
transparent about the specific offenses being pardoned, the requirement
would deter the President from granting pardons for particularly egregious
and problematic crimes. It is one thing to pardon an associate for all crimes
committed in the past year, quite another to pardon the associate for, say,
conspiring with a foreign power to disrupt the presidential elections.
Transparency in pardoning, in other words, raises the political costs of
pardons. To be sure, a desperate President, fearing that investigators are hot
on his heels, might still decide to grant a pardon to his underlings or
associates.180 But forcing the President to list the crimes pardoned still serves
a purpose: it publicly exposes the nature of the recipient’s wrongdoing and
thus permits public debate about the appropriateness of the pardon. In that
way, the specificity requirement facilitates a debate about whether the
pardon power has been misused and whether impeachment is an appropriate
remedy.
Transparency is only the first of several important benefits generated by
the specificity requirement. The rule also limits the scope of any individual
pardon. With a specificity rule in place, a single pardon cannot give the
recipient any guarantee that he won’t be subject to a subsequent federal
prosecution on different grounds. Thus, for example, Paul Manafort might
hope that President Trump would pardon him for his crimes of conviction
(and perhaps for other potential charges too). But he cannot be sure that the
federal prosecutors would not bring up additional charges at some later time.
Someone like Manafort might hope, if new charges are brought, that
President Trump would issue a second pardon encompassing the new
indictments. But the need to issue repeated pardons raises the political cost
to the President, requiring him to name and highlight new crimes each time.
Even more importantly, a defendant could not be assured that Trump would
still be in office when the new charges were brought, leaving him vulnerable
to prosecution without a protector. In short, a specificity requirement would
make pardons—and particularly preemptive pardons—less final and less
valuable, undermining the prospective value of a pardon and increasing the
pressure on the accused to cooperate with investigators.181
180

Id. at 504 (“Experience . . . has shown that a President could partake in a subversion of the
Constitution and risk ‘the damnation of his fame to all future ages.’”).
181
The specificity requirement would also make “preemptive pardons”—that is, pardons prior to
indictment—much less attractive. Because they are issued before conviction and indictment, preemptive
pardons are issued without certainty over the ultimate charges that will be brought against the defendants.
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Finally, a specificity requirement would make the option of a
“self-pardon” far less attractive to the President. Scholars, of course, are far
from certain that a President has the constitutional authority to pardon
himself, and they have good reasons to be skeptical.182 Nonetheless, even if
a self-pardon were permissible, the specificity requirement would reduce its
usefulness. To ensure he would be fully insulated from prosecution, a
President would have to offer a comprehensive list of each and every
possible federal crime he had committed. Should he miss a charge, the
President would remain vulnerable to federal prosecution upon leaving
office.
In the end, a specificity requirement cannot stop a desperate President
from misusing the pardon power to hinder a federal investigation. But it can
make the effort more difficult, and it can help bring to light the details of the
crimes being absolved. Given the extraordinary breadth of the pardon power,
and its anomalous role in the American constitutional system, the specificity
requirement might seem like an exceptionally modest protection. Yet, the
restriction may prove more significant than it first appears, resting as it does
on a powerful insight, famously articulated by Justice Brandeis, that
transparency may be the best remedy for governmental abuse.183
CONCLUSION
The argument for a specificity requirement is strong. It is justified under
an originalist reading of the Constitution, and it is fully consistent with the
core ideals of the nation’s founding. Of course, to say that the Supreme Court
If lawful, vague and general preemptive pardons would be a particularly useful tool for a President
seeking to cover up crimes, since that kind of pardon could be used to disrupt an investigation relatively
early in the process and could be issued without naming particular charges. The specificity requirement
thus reduces the appeal of preemptive pardons. To use a preemptive pardon in that situation, a President
would need to speculate on the kinds of crimes that the recipient might be charged with, and the recipient
would be left with the risk that the pardon would prove insufficient.
182
See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential
Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 809 (1996) (“Presidents cannot pardon themselves.”); James Pfiffner,
Pardon
Power,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
HERITAGE
GUIDE
TO
CONST.,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/89/pardon-power (last visited Oct. 11, 2019)
(“The possibility of a President pardoning himself for a crime is not precluded by the explicit language
of the Constitution. . . . But a broader reading of the Constitution and the general principles of the
traditions of United States law might lead to the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutionally
impermissible. It would seem to violate the principles that a man should not be a judge in his own case;
that the rule of law is supreme and the United States is a nation of laws, not men; and that the President
is not above the law.”); see also Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, 1 Op. O.L.C. 370,
370 (1974) (“This raises the question whether the President can pardon himself. Under the fundamental
rule that no one may be a judge in his own case, it would seem that the question should be answered in
the negative.”).
183
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
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should interpret the Pardon Clause to include a specificity requirement is not
to say that it will do so. The Supreme Court often acts in mysterious ways,
and it may turn a blind eye to the original meaning of the clause.184
Nonetheless, in the current political climate, even the possibility that the
federal courts might adopt a specificity requirement is significant. Any
individual who relies on the prospect of receiving a broad, unlimited pardon
to insulate himself from prosecution must discount the value of that pardon
by the risk that such a pardon might be vulnerable to challenge.185 As the
prospective value of a vague pardon declines, the attractiveness of reaching
a deal with the prosecution increases.
That leads to the final, and perhaps counterintuitive, point. Regardless
of how the courts ultimately rule on this issue, simply starting a conversation
about the validity of the specificity requirement might have a practical
impact on the course of the various investigations into the 2016 election.
Increased awareness about the vulnerability of general pardons to legal
challenge strengthens the hand of the investigators. That, in turn, increases
the likelihood that the truth about the campaign will emerge, whatever that
truth is.

184

Moreover, to bring a test case, a prosecutor like Robert Mueller would need to be willing to
challenge an overly broad pardon.
185
The defendant might receive a more specific pardon, of course, and avoid the danger. But such
a pardon would be far less beneficial, since it would leave the defendant open to future prosecution should
new facts emerge about possible wrongdoings.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF AMNESTIES
Date
7/10/1795
5/21/1800

President
Recipients
Washington Pennsylvania Insurgents
during Fries Rebellion
Adams
Individuals prosecuted under
Alien & Seditions Act
Jefferson
Military deserters
Jefferson
Military deserters
Madison
Barataria pirates for desertion

3/5/1804
10/15/1807
2/7/1812;
10/8/18/12;
6/17/1814
2/6/1815
Madison
6/12/1830

Jackson

8/6/1846

Polk

3/10/1863
12/8/1863

Lincoln
Lincoln

3/11/1865
5/29/1865

Lincoln
Johnson

9/7/1867

Johnson

7/4/1868

Johnson

12/25/1868

Johnson

12/13/1873

Grant

1/4/1893

Harrison

9/25/1894

Cleveland

6/21/1900

McKinley

Certain persons who inhabited
New Orleans, adjacent area,
or Barataria Island.
Cherokee Indians
(incorporated into treaty)
Political prisoners prosecuted
under Sedition Act
Deserters
Persons who participated in
rebellion
Deserters
Persons who participated in
rebellion
Persons who have committed
treason
Persons who have committed
treason
Persons who have committed
treason
Sailors and marines for
desertion
Members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints for bigamy
Members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints
Insurrectionists in the

Offense
identified?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
X
X
Yes
Yes
Yes*
Yes
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
X

186
The contents of this appendix were compiled by the author and his research assistants through
the use of publicly available sources. The information and sources are on file with the author.
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7/4/1902
6/14/1917
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T.
Roosevelt
Wilson

3/5/1924
12/23/1933

Coolidge
F.
Roosevelt

12/24/1945

Truman

12/23/1947

Truman

12/24/1952

Truman

12/24/1952

Truman

9/16/1974

Ford

1/21/1977

Carter

Philippine Islands
Insurrectionists in the
Philippine Islands
Certain individuals under
suspended sentence
Military deserters in WWI
Individuals convicted of
violating espionage or draft
laws during WWI
WWII veterans who violated
federal law prior to military
service
Persons who violated draft
laws during WWII
Certain Korean War veterans
who violated federal law prior
to military service
Servicemen convicted of
desertion between the end of
WWII and start of Korean
War
Vietnam era draft evaders and
deserters
Draft law violators
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X
X
Yes
Yes
X
Yes
X
Yes

Yes
Yes

*An asterisk signifies that the offense was implied by language, but not explicit.

